














A thesis submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
For the Degree 
Masters of 
European Union Studies 
at the 
University of Canterbury 
 










































 i  
  
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... III 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... IV 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................... VI 
CHAPTER 1 ......................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT TYPE OF AN ACTOR IS THE EU? ................................................................ 7 
1.2.  WHY STUDY EU DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICAN UNION? ................................................................. 9 
CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................... 13 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................... 13 
2.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EU- AU RELATIONSHIP .............................................................. 13 
2.2 LOMÉ CONVENTION ........................................................................................................... 14 
2.3 THE COTONOU PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (CPA) .................................................................... 15 
2.4 THE BRITISH REFERENDUM IN CONTEXT OF EU DEVELOPMENT ..................................................... 16 
2.5 EUROPEAN UNION AS A NORMATIVE POWER: IS IT NORMATIVE? ................................................. 20 
2.6 THE EU AS A DEVELOPMENT AID PROVIDER .............................................................................. 22 
2.7 A CALL TO STRENGTHENING AFRICAN-EU PARTNERSHIP ............................................................. 26 
2.8 A NEW BEGINNING: ENTERING THE JOINT AFRICA EUROPE STRATEGY (JAES) ................................. 27 
2.9 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE ..................................................................................................... 27 
2.9.1 SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... 28 
CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................... 29 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 29 
3.1 THEORY: NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE (NPE) ......................................................................... 29 
3.2 RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING “NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE” ....................................................... 31 
3.3 CRITICISM OF NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE ............................................................................. 32 
3.4 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 34 
3.5 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. ...................................................................................................... 36 
3.6. LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................... 38 
 
 ii  
  
CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................................................... 39 
4.1 DETERMINING IF ONE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN POVERTY: POVERTY INDICATORS ............................... 39 
4.2 JOINT AFRICA -EUROPEAN STRATEGY TO FIGHT POVERTY ............................................................ 44 
4.3 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JAES ...................................................................................... 46 
4.4 THE EU’S OTHER POLICY IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUMENTS ......................................................... 46 
4.5 PILLAR 1: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION .......................... 48 
4.6 PILLAR 2: THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SDGS ............................................................................ 49 
4.7 PILLAR 3: CREATING AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM .............................................................. 51 
4.9 PILLAR 4: PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE BASED PARTNERSHIP ................................................................... 53 
4.9.1 OVERALL ANALYSIS OF THE JAES ........................................................................................ 54 
4.9.2 CHALLENGES TOWARDS THE JAES SUCCESS .......................................................................... 56 
4.9.3 SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... 57 
CHAPTER 5 ....................................................................................................................... 58 
5.1 COULD THE DEPARTURE OF THE UK HAVE ANY IMPLICATION ON THE EU’S POVERTY REDUCTION AGENDA?
 ............................................................................................................................................ 58 
5.2 THE ROLE OF THE UK IN THE EU ............................................................................................ 59 
5.3 WHAT WOULD CHANGE IF THE UK IS OUT? .............................................................................. 60 
5.4 THE IMPACT TO ACHIEVING SDGS ......................................................................................... 61 
5.5 THE UK IMPACT ON TRADE DEALS .......................................................................................... 62 
5.6 THE UK’S CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECTS IN AFRICA ............................... 63 
5.7 THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE EU BUDGET ............................................................................ 64 
5.8 THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON AID DESTINED FOR AFRICAN UNION PROJECTS ...................................... 67 
5.9 CAN THE EU REMAIN A MODEL FOR AU INTEGRATION? ............................................................. 68 
CHAPTER 6 ....................................................................................................................... 70 
6.1    THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON LIVING STANDARDS, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH ..................... 70 
6.2 THE IMPACT ON POLICY FRAMEWORK:  THE EU NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT THE UK ........................... 71 
6.3 THE COTONOU RENEWAL NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................................ 72 
6.4 THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM ....................................................................... 72 
6.5 THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF BREXIT ON POVERTY REDUCTION IN AFRICA ....................................... 72 
6.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 74 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 78 
 








This thesis would have not been possible without the support of a number of people I would 
like to acknowledge. A million thanks to Dr Serena Kelly, who always encouraged me and told 
me it was possible every time I questioned my decision of enrolling towards the degree. To 
Professor Martin Holland, your expertise in development inspired and encouraged me to 
soldier on. To Dr Natalia Chaban, thank you for taking me through the research methods. To 
the NCRE family at Canterbury University, thanks you. To EUCN, thank you for the financial 
support towards this Masters degree. 
 
Finally, to my wife, Yvonne, and my children, TK, Helen and Christopher, thank you for your 
patience while I took the time away from you to do research. I hope I have inspired you to 

























LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AU African Union 
EU European Union 
EEAS European External Action Service 
UN United Nations 
EUGS European Union Global Strategy 
EC European Commission 
IO International Organisation 

















Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
Joint Africa European Strategy 
Directorate General 
Gross National Income 
Official Development Aid 
European Development Fund 
Common Agriculture policy 
Millennium Development Goals 
Sustainable Development Goals 
Economic Partnership Agreements 
Civil Society Organisations 
Least Developed Countries 
Normative Power Europe 
National Centre for Research on Europe 
Global Program on Agriculture Research for Development 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
 








Development cooperation instrument 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights 
Development Assistance Committee 
Instrument for stability and humanitarian aid 
Pan African Programme 





LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index: Poverty Dimension and Indicators .......... 37 
Figure 2: Human Development Poverty Report 2018 ............................................................ 41 
Figure 3: Intensity of Multidimensional Poverty Index: Child Poverty by Region .................. 41 
Figure 4: Where do the 559 million poor people in sub-Sahara Africa live? .......................... 43 
Figure 5: Share Total ODA to Africa 2015 ............................................................................... 48 
Figure 6: Total EU budget with the UK ................................................................................... 65 




Table 1: Poverty Indicators ..................................................................................................... 40 






























1.1 Introduction: What type of an actor is the EU?  
 
Scholars have asked whether the European Union (EU) should be referred to as a civilian 
power (Duchêne, 1973) rather than a military power (Bull, 1982). Others have argued that the 
EU is neither a civilian nor a military power but a normative power (Manners, 2002). Manners 
(2002) argues that the EU is a normative power because the EU promotes its norms and values 
without the use of military force. In the endeavour to support developing countries through 
a set of diffusional methods, the EU has managed to transfer its norms (Börzel & Risse, 2009).  
 
Unlike other big powers, who intervene in global politics with the use of force, the EU uses 
ethical means when interacting with its external partners to maintain world peace. The use 
of carrots and sticks has been identified as a reasonable method to coerce other countries to 
adopt EU values and norms. These values, which are considered non-violent, are: human 
rights, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. The EU rewards its external partners 
for adopting these norms in the way of social, political, economic, and development 
assistance. The carrot for taking and placing these democratic values in the partners’ 
legislative framework can be in the form of development aid, and the stick may be in the form 
of the use of sanctions. The EU uses both positive and negative reinforcement to shape the 
external political landscape and interact with the rest of the world. For Africa and the African 
Union, in particular, economic assistance has been vital, since future EU membership is not 
an option. 
 
The European Union’s development strategy in Africa has been instrumental in reducing 
poverty in many parts of the continent. The EU’s development success is recorded in areas of 
economic, political, social, security, peace, justice, and human development. The ability of the 
EU to disseminate its norms (Manners, 2002) through Africa can be credited to the continent’s 
historical linkages. Since the formation of the EU (previously called the European Economic 
Community (EEC)), relationships with African countries have been vital for the EU member 
states, who had previously occupied most parts of Africa. France, Belgium, and the United 




independence, it became mandatory for these European countries to help with development 
and better the lives of Africans, open more trading markets for the EEC but ultimately to 
consolidate European influence over Africa. For some time, the EU has been regarded as an 
influential player in both politics and economics in Africa. Its political influence is credited to 
the formation of the African Union (AU), which many claim is inspired by the EU framework 
(Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Fioramonti & Mattheis, 2016; Haastrup, 2013). As a supranational 
organisation, the AU considered the EU as a good model for regional integration and a perfect 
partner for region-to-region dialogue (Ayed, 2009), making it easy for the EU and AU to 
negotiate trade deals collectively. 
 
From the onset of the relationship, the EU has taken upon itself a leadership role in 
eradicating poverty in Africa. The 1957 Treaty of Rome set out that financial and technical 
support should be made available to African counterparts and other developing countries to 
help them develop their economies. This led to the formation of the European Development 
Fund, which is aimed to finance development initiatives in developing countries (Rein, 2017). 
Through a series of agreements, the EU has continuously highlighted the importance of equal 
opportunities by helping the under-privileged communities with emphasis at completely 
poverty reduction throughout Africa. The reduction of poverty remains one of the core 
principles in the European Union Global Strategy. Such an undertaking by the EU has inspired 
the main scope of this thesis. The research seeks to investigate if there will be any implications 
on EU’s poverty reduction agenda in Africa post-Brexit? since the UK is one of the most 
influential and biggest members states in the EU both economically and by populations. 
Working with other multilateral organisations like the UN and the World Bank has enabled 
the EU to gain legitimacy in the continent and is part of NPE. By consistently addressing 
poverty as the primary target, the EU received recognition as a champion for development. 
In 2016, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the MDGs. At the centre of the 
SDGs, is the desire to eradicate poverty, promote equality, provide education for all, better 







1.2.  Why study EU development in African Union? 
 
The choice to study development in Africa is vital, since the EU spends more than half of its 
development budget in Africa pursuing efforts to eradicate poverty in all of its forms as the 
aim of the European Union Global Strategy of 2016 and SDGs. The SDGs, as outlined by the 
UN, are the foundation for a better future for all. The goals are designed to address world 
challenges and provide solutions to issues such as poverty, inequality, climate, 
environmental, peace, justice, and prosperity with a projected deadline of 2030. As a 
multilateral organisation, the EU played a vital role at the UN meetings to ensure that a plan 
was adopted to improve social equality, economic development, and environmental 
protection remains a top priority on the agenda. The SDGs were therefore agreed upon as a 
collective idea. 
 
Helly (2013) as cited by Gumbo (2019) in a literature review has argued that, the relationship 
between the EU and the AU has captured much attention since early 2005 as African leaders 
began to complain about relationship inequalities. (Helly, 2013; Gumbo, 2019). Helly (2013) 
identified four areas of contention that have ignited the debates as: “economic, 
development, governance and politics and multilateralism.” In the author’s previous 
research, when reviewing literature, Gumbo argued the relationship started as a donor-
recipient partnership and grew to be one of the most admired projects of the European 
integration project (Lister, 2002; Gumbo, 2019), at least to the EU. However, for the past 
decade, the relationship has faced many challenges. For instance, irregular migration to 
Europe, the European financial crises, increased terrorist activity, nationalist movements, the 
rise of other global actors (especially China), and the USA’s interest in the region (Hackenesch, 
2015; Helly, 2013; Rein, 2017).  
 
Apart from competition from other actors, some have argued that internal EU factors have 
exacerbated the continental drift which has been witnessed between the EU-AU cooperation 
from the early 2000 (Helly, 2013). Helly (2013) and Lister (2002) contend that continental drift 
has cost the EU its leadership position in development to China, though it still managed to 
maintain its position as a financial giant. The author’s earlier research reviewing literature, 




unresolved problems in the European Union camp, for example: internal conflicts, member 
states’ interests, and home country politics (Gumbo, 2019). Development has several facets, 
thus EU development is broad and covers many areas, including, trade, immigration, climate 
change, security, human development and diplomacy (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 
2017). Any disruption of the EU development policy agenda has detrimental effects on a 
variety of these areas.  
 
In the context of Brexit, the role played by the UK at EU negotiations on subjects regarding 
African development is vital. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will result in Africa losing an 
advocate within the EU. Due to the UK’s colonial linkages with most African countries, the UK 
has been able to maintain a respectable stance on African development issues. The UK was 
vital to the formation of the Joint African European Strategy (JAES) and took a leading position 
in backing the incorporation of the MDGs and other programmes like the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) into the JAES agreement (Cumming & 
Chafer 2011). Though the MDGs are now outdated, the new revisions to the JAES have 
continued to adopt the SDGs. The loss of a voice within the EU could have a detrimental effect 
on African development, particularly in light of poverty reduction efforts. 
 
This thesis will examine the relationship between the AU and EU through the lens of the JAES 
in order to identify whether the departure of the UK from the EU will have any impact on the 
EU’s development policy. The research is led by the following research question: What are 
the possible implications of Brexit on the EU’s poverty reduction agenda in Africa?   
 
As Brexit has not yet happened, the impacts are still uncertain, therefore much of the thesis 
will feed on the current relationship landscape as outlined in partnership agreements, and 
the context of development between the EU and AU. Specific attention will be placed on 
analysing the documents and events post the signing of the JAES. The JAES is a 2007 
agreement between the EU and the AU to help cement the relationship between the African 
continent and the EU. The document aimed to improve the EU-AU relationship by setting out 
a strategic set of goals: reinforcing political dialogue between Africa and the EU (peace and 
security, institutional cooperation, climate change); expanding Africa-EU cooperation 




finally, promoting a people-centered partnership (equality, economics and human 
development) (Eurostat, 2014). The JAES was inspired by ideas of equality between the EU 
and AU. The main goals were to be achieved through a set of action plans (Helly, 2013). The 
thesis will review JAES as the driver of the current EU-AU relationship, in particular, the 
incorporation of SDGs and the use of different EU development instruments to reduce 
poverty in Africa. As stated in section 72 of the JAES, agriculture remains one of the most 
important areas to deliver results in the area of poverty. With this in mind, the reform of CAP, 
as demanded by the UK, as a way forward to create sustainable economic growth and curb 
poverty in Africa becomes an area of concern. Agriculture has the potential to provide income 
for farmers, and contribute to human capital, human well-being, food security and poverty 
alleviation. 
 
Traditionally, poverty has been measured by consumption expenditure indicators, which 
rates poverty by the $1.90 per day expenditure, while in real life people encounter different 
types and levels of needs. Poverty can take various forms, and people define poverty in 
accordance with their circumstances (Alkire, Kanagaratnam & Suppa, 2018). In Africa, over 40 
percent of the population live on under $1.25 a day, unemployment is high, and the 
population is rising; leading to over 750 million people living in poverty (Foresight, 2011). 
Against this backdrop, various approaches should be in place to counter poverty in all its 
forms. Reform in agriculture is vital, since the industry provides most of the employment for 
people living in rural areas and provides food for most households. The SDGs progress reports 
will provide neutral empirical evidence as to whether the EU has managed to assist Africa in 
achieving the goal to reduce poverty. The past and current inconsistencies within the EU will 
provide the basis for this thesis speculative projections, scenarios and the possible 
implications of Britain’s departure from the EU and the AU’s development plans.  
 
Through the historical lens, the thesis will demonstrate that the UK has played an essential 
role in African development, and that the EU’s desire to reduce poverty in Africa may face 
future challenges. We hypothesise that the UK’s planned departure from the EU will leave a 
gap in the EU budget, as the UK will stop contributing towards the EU development budget 





The organisation of the thesis will follow the following structure: The second chapter will 
review some of the literature to set the scene and provide the foundation of the study, 
followed by a discussion of the historical evolution of the EU-AU relationship, with a particular 
focus on development assistance. The chapter will unpack the historical origins of the EU 
development agenda and explain why the AU is a strategic beneficiary for EU development 
assistance. Past conventions and current agreements will also be discussed. Lomé, Cotonou 
will be discussed briefly, while a more detailed analysis is offered to the JAES, as it is the only 
and current agreement tailored to African countries and the JAES framework’s main agenda 
is focused on poverty eradication and thus greatly informs the analysis.  
 
Chapter Three will address the methodology and theoretical framework of the thesis. 
Normative Power Europe was chosen as the theoretical paradigm to demonstrate how the 
EU gained its leadership status in Africa. The NPE theoretical framework plays a role when 
analysing EU global success, as the EU’s development agenda is driven by its desire to assert 
itself as a global normative power. The EU’s continuous use of economic and development 
assistance as a reward for adopting EU norms and values demonstrate that the EU has gained 
a normative power status in Africa through this mechanism.  
 
Chapter 4 will introduce Brexit as a critical variable to the future of EU development. The 
departure of the UK is essential to the study due to the UK’s historical ties with AU countries 
and its financial contributions towards the EU budget. The concluding chapter will offer 














Historical overview and Literature review  
 
The EU has been described in so many ways, with Mark Eyskens calling it, “an economic giant, 
military worm and political dwarf” (Whitney 1991). Studies on the nature of the EU and how 
the EU conducts itself outside of Europe has resulted in significant literature from many 
scholars of international relations. This Chapter will review the literature from these studies 
in order to offer an overview of the EU and how the EU act in Africa to reduce poverty. In 
order to understand why and how the EU continues to work closely with the AU, this chapter 
will start with a historical background to the relationship. The historical background will set 
the stage in understanding and answer the How, the Why questions and introduce the 
rational for the chosen theory to this thesis. 
 
2.1. Historical Background on EU- AU relationship 
 
The relationship between the EU and African countries predates the formation of the EU 
itself, making it one of the oldest EU regional diplomatic projects (Farrell, 2005; Men & 
Barton, 2011). This long-standing relationship institutionalised through a series of 
agreements has enabled strong regional cooperation. The African regional integration project 
was established in 1963 (formerly known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and 
changing its name to the African Union in 2002) and has always admired the EU’s regional 
integration model (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). The connection of the EU to Africa can also be linked 
to when most African countries existed under European colonial powers. It was only in the 
mid-20th century, when colonisation was abrogated, that African countries started gaining 
independence from their colonial masters (Rein, 2017) and they came together in unity. In 
1957 the relationship between the EU and AU was formalised in the Treaty of Rome.  
 
As Hansen notes, the idea of maintaining and strengthening Europe’s relationship with its 
former empires was first recorded in the 1950 Schuman Declaration as the only way colonial 
powers could keep their influence on its former colonies and outside territories (Hansen et 




officialised, starting with a budget just shy of $58 million (Flint, 2009) to be used towards 
development in Europe’s overseas territories. When the UK finally joined the EU in 1973, 
former British colonies became part of the beneficiaries, since the UK had overseas interests 
different from Belgium and France (Galtung, 1973). This fund was a way to help Europe’s ex-
colonial territories (Flint, 2008, 2009). This point indicates that the EU’s first iteration had a 
colonial viewpoint (Hansen et al., 2012) and, as will be explained in detail in the theoretical 
segment, the EU endeavoured to export its norms and values in areas of its market and 
political interest. 
 
2.2 Lomé Convention 
 
The 1975 Lomé Convention marked a historic new beginning for the EU and AU, as it signalled 
an unprecedented change to the relationship formerly driven by colonial ideas to one based 
on equality and cooperation (Farrell, 2007; Hill & Smith, 2011). The signing of the Lomé 
convention changed the tone to the EU-AU relationship (Helly 2013). The Lomé Convention, 
the predecessor of the 1964-75 Yaoundé Convention, became the pinnacle that represents 
an ethical relationship between the EU and AU, a step towards equality, partnership, 
cooperation, and sovereignty. These became the core principles to guide the future 
relationship between the EU and AU. Because the principles of Treaty of Rome guided Lomé, 
the EU wanted the Lomé agreement to complement the UN Charter, hence placing a strong 
focus on cooperation, trade, poverty eradication, and many other goals outlined in the MDGs. 
 
The signing of the Lomé trading agreement offered African states exclusive rights and access 
to EU markets, creating a bond between the two institutions (Flint, 2008). The agreement 
enabled the creation of structures necessary to facilitate a better negotiating platform (Flint, 
2009). As the relationship evolved and some goals of Lomé were achieved, it became 
necessary to re-evaluate, which meant a need to set out a more strategic partnership. These 
Lomé revisions were criticised, in particular, by the UK House of Commons International 
Development Committee which identified nuances of unfairness, bullying and blackmail 





The current proposals would transform Lomé into a battering ram for free trade, 
forcing the infant industries of the developing countries in the ACP into unfair 
competition with the industrialised economies of Europe. Lomé should focus on 
poverty-focused trade development and the building of supply-trade capacity so 
that trade and investment can become a vehicle for human and social 
development. (Clements, 1998) 
 
Liz Clements’ comment clearly laments the UK’s interests and the divisions among the EU 
when it comes to issues of development in Africa. When the Africans analyse these 
comments, they create a bias towards the UK. The UK then becomes a preferred partner, as 
it is perceived to understand and have a higher level of care for Africa. The perceived 
leadership position held by Britain in Africa (at least by the Africans) is fundamental for the 
EU and AU’s continuous relationship. This kind of position held by the British leads to the 
question: “Will the EU still be a relevant partner for the African Union post-Brexit?” In the last 
few years, it became evident that the partnership needed to be revised if the EU wanted 
cooperation from their African counterparts. Lomé was deemed to be out-dated and not in 
keeping with the World Trade Organisation standards (Men & Barton, 2011). 
 
2.3 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) 
  
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries came into force in the year 2000 as an attempt to improve on the Lomé 
agreement (Helly, 2013). The Cotonou Agreement could be considered a level-up partnership 
to be entered into between the EU and AU, as it is the most comprehensive agreement to 
have been signed between the two (Holland, 2002). The CPA partnership therefore wanted 
to achieve three goals: reduce poverty, contribute towards sustainable development, and 
trade cooperation and the integration of ACP countries (Article 1, 2000) while enriching their 
economies and encouraging political engagement (Keijzer & Negre, 2014).  
 
Critics of the CPA agreement have summarised it as “a diktat rather than a genuine 
partnership agreement” (Flint, 2008). These sentiments are common among African member 
states who are not ready to adopt the EU norms in full. Cotonou was meant to act as a 
connecting link between the EU and less-developed countries (LDCs), but poor coordination 




a disconnection from the past. However, empirical findings suggest the opposite. Sentiments 
by Carlos Lopes, the African Union High Representative, suggest that the AU has had enough 
of the EU and is no longer going to be soft when it comes to negotiating trade deals (Euroactiv, 
2018). By the 2000s, aid going to Africa reduced by over 50% compared to a decade earlier. 
Therefore, the mandate of poverty eradication through sustainable development has failed 
or been overpowered by political interests (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). 
 
 It is also important to note that the Cotonou agreement, while still up for revision in 2020, 
has not been able to match the rhetoric or mend the gap which is continuously growing 
between the two continents. Critics of the ongoing Cotonou agreement have argued that 
both Lomé and Cotonou have failed to address their goals in five policy areas: partnership, 
political development, poverty eradication, regional integration, and economic and trade 
development. The African states are complaining of extreme poverty and the impact of 
political conditionality as one of the many contributors to their predicament. This has made 
Africans look for help elsewhere, and China became a better alternative. Even with the 
Cotonou, the EU has failed to fulfil Article 131 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The article 
stipulates the importance of promoting the economic, social, and cultural interests as desired 
by developing countries, of which all of these targeted areas are important for poverty 
reduction. 
 
 2.4 The British referendum in context of EU development 
 
Following the June 2016 UK referendum, the UK decided to leave the EU.  The decision by the 
UK electorate to leave the EU surprised many and posed many more questions than answers 
as to how the EU would manage to further its commitments on development. Many who 
imagined the EU as a model representing unity and as a like-minded group of people who 
share the same values, who would always stick together for better or worse, found 
themselves wondering. As such, the EU-UK divorce inspired this research. Mainly, because 
the EU is an important donor for African states that has used aid to alleviate poverty in the 
region for years. Additionally, the UK is the leading donor at a bilateral level and the most 




big three together with France and Germany due to its role in the EU policy making and 
economic strengths (Whitman & Wolff, 2012,p.10) 
 
The financial support dedicated to developing counties by the EU through its development 
instruments is significant when compared to other superpowers. Since the Lisbon Treaty and 
the introduction of the European External Action Service and Directorate General for 
Development and Cooperation dedicated to pursuing development in the EU neighbourhood, 
the EU has been able to establish a development leadership status (Gavas et al., 2013). The 
ever-growing global population is increasingly demanding serious strategic commitment and 
innovative ways to counter the possibility of poverty, famine, and malnutrition crises. Of all 
the countries expected to be vulnerable to poverty, African countries are at the top of the list. 
Henökl (2018) has argued that Brexit’s implications are both from short- and long-term. Due 
to existing EU obligations, any budget shortfalls create problems for the EU’s development 
policy. Policy realignment will be difficult without one of the EU’s major financial contributors 
(Gavas et al., 2013; Henökl, 2018). While Henökl’s conclusions are speculative in nature, the 
recommendations to make sure that the EU acts appropriately in order to ensure that the 
Brexit phenomenon will not affect development commitments currently underway in 
developing countries and future development policies should be considered vital.  
 
Ansorg and Haastrup (2016) have analysed the Brexit phenomenon and argue that Brexit does 
not only affect the UK-EU 27 economies, but has detrimental economic and geopolitical 
effects on Africa. Most of the African countries who consider the UK a strategic partner have 
their economies dependant on the UK, therefore, are likely to suffer in case of a UK recession. 
The UK is one of the few countries that have kept their promise to contribute funds at a 
consistent percentage towards the European Development Fund (EDF). To show its 
commitment towards aid, the UK has included aid contribution in its laws. The impact of 
recession also affects the UK contribution towards ODA. The UK is one of the few countries 
who contribute 0.7% GNI towards ODA and is seen as an influential player in international 
development (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). This significant contribution will be 





Ansorg and Haastrup also argued that the exit of Britain would mean a loss for Africans, as 
the UK has been a well-known advocate for African affairs within the EU, in particular in the 
Common Agriculture Policy debates (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Haas & Rubio, 2017). The UK’s 
understanding and history of relations with African countries were vital for the promotion of 
African interest in the EU. However, Ansorg and Haastrup did not address the issue of poverty 
reduction, a role assumed by the EU as part of its commitment to help Africa achieve the 
MDGs. Due to the growing population in Africa, with an estimation that by 2050 Africa will 
have the biggest population in the world, Africa becomes a critical region to watch as it is 
susceptible to severe poverty (Cohen, 2003). 
 
Haas and Rubio (2017) have presented a qualitative argument showing that, without the UK, 
the EU will suffer a significant budget-gap. The budget deficit is estimated at around 10 billion 
euros per year. Contrary to Nunez-Ferrer and Rinaldi’s arguments, a 10 billion deficit is a 
significant amount of money compared to how much the EU spends on its development 
budget. Haas and Rubio (2017)’s simulation predicts the possibilities that could happen in 
trying to counter the budget shortfall. Important to note, is the recognition of the looming 
possibility that the EU might cut spending on CAP and the development budget. These cuts 
would hurt aid recipients (Haas & Rubio, 2017). Their research also agrees with Ansorg & 
Haastrup (2016) that Brexit will disrupt the EU’s development budget. 
 
Haas and Rubio concluded by providing two solutions that could help if the EU wants to cover 
any budget deficit after Brexit. The recommendation is that the EU should go through a 
complete revenue sources reshuffle, be flexible, and focus on clearly defined goals (Haas & 
Rubio, 2017). The research did not address the impact of the budget deficit on poverty 
reduction programmes. If the EU is to aim at clearly defined goals, these goals should include 
focusing on areas of poverty reduction in countries experiencing severe famine and hunger. 
 
Lightfoot et al. (2017), who also agreed that Brexit has implications for the EU's development 
goals, have argued that both the UK and EU will feel the implications. The UK and the EU will 
both experience challenges on its development policy implementation. In the past, both the 




has played a significant role (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). The UK helped to 
drive EU development priorities by influencing EU operations and providing finance. The UK’s 
commitment towards the EDF contributions aiming at development in Africa shows how 
much the UK values the region. Sophia Price (2016) stated that the completion of Brexit could 
affect the UK’s position in global development and its historical trade relations with African 
ACP countries. 
 
The lengthy negotiations that followed after the UK triggered article 50 left scholars and 
experts debating whether the European model of integration is actually good for Africa. Some 
have gone so far as to call for the EU to leave African problems to African people. Peter Draper 
(2012) argued that the “economic integration is not appropriate as in most cases, it produces 
more harm than good”. Draper concluded that there was a big gap between the ideological 
character of states in Europe and Africa. This conclusion could help explain why the two 
institutions, despite a good motive and the right intentions, have continuously missed the 
point – which is aligning their policies to areas that matter for the ordinary people 
 
Amid all the problems within the EU and the inconsistencies in policy implementation, China 
has utilised the opportunity and assert itself as an alternative model for development in Africa 
(Men & Barton, 2011). China has capitalised from the EU’s credibility loss and controversial 
foreign policies in Africa by offering unconditional development aid. These EU troubles have 
helped Mr. Xi Jinping’s government to acquire significant goodwill in Africa (Wang & Elliot, 
2014). This goodwill is evident in Chinese investments, aid provisions, security, and trading 
relations between the AU and China. In 2013 alone, China became Africa's largest trading 
partner, with a total of US$199 billion investment,a growth of 114% from 5 years before. Since 
Africa seeks to benefit its economies, China is becoming a new source of economic 
opportunities.  
 
China has been accused of providing African countries with unconditional development aid 
and loans considered to undermine EU development strategies (Hackenesch, 2015). In line 
with this, this thesis considers this opportunity to cherry-pick problematic, as the 
unconditional aid by China to Africa has the potential to undermine fundamental human 




deter non-democratic leaders from undermining fundamental human rights, otherwise risk 
development assistance. Without the “stick”, it is tempting for authoritarian leaders to 
undermine human rights, leading to a decline in development and increase in poverty. 
 
Even though people are panicking over the budget shortfalls, others are speculating a minimal 
effect on the EU budget (Nunez-Ferrer & Rinaldi, 2016). This conclusion is based on the 
amount of the UK rebates compared to its EU contribution in order to keep access to the 
internal markets. This analysis by Nunez-Ferrer and Rinaldi does not take into consideration 
the impact Brexit has on external relations. Their research only focuses on UK-EU future 
economic challenges. This perspective creates an opportunity for this thesis to examine how 
these gaps could lead to severe food shortages and dire conditions for African countries. As 
this research seeks to identify all possible channels that could undermine existing EU efforts 
to reduce poverty, any financial reduction towards the EDF is considered detrimental. 
 
2.5 European Union as a Normative Power: Is it normative? 
 
Literature explaining the role of the EU in the world is plenty, but the most popular angle 
when studying EU external relations is Manners’ (2002) normative power paradigm. This 
thesis considers this Normative Power Europe (hereafter NPE) to study EU-Africa relations 
based on the three epistemological groupings suggested by Manners (2002): 1) Ontological – 
meaning the ability to change norms; 2) Positivist – regarding how the EU changes norms; and 
3) Normative – how the EU acts while extending its norms and values. The idea of normative 
power by Manners (2002) suggests that the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world has 
evolved over time, making it a special player with extraordinary power which is neither civilian 
nor military but normative. Manners suggested that there are ways other than military force 
which the EU uses to extend its influence in the world. Manners summarised the EU’s power 
claim as follows: 
    
The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU 
constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act 
in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, and usually 
overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international 





Ian Manners’ notion of NPE suggests that the EU's external relations and its actorness is found 
in the framework of what it is and is to some extent “normatively cultured” (Elgström & Smith, 
2006). He suggests that the EU’s core values and norms are what defines its actorness in 
external relations. This idea emanates from Duchene’s complementing concept of the Civilian 
Power paradigm. Duchene (1973) coined the term Civilian Power after analysing the EU’s 
power as based primarily on its economic muscle, not its military capabilities (Kohnstamm, 
1973). Francois Duchene understood or believed that economic power was a better tool to 
be used in international relations than traditional military force. In response to this, Manners 
wanted to cite that: “Europe’s role in the world is not determined by what it does or what it 
says but is embedded in what it is” (Manners 2002, p. 252).  
 
Manners’ study of the EU and its position on the death penalty was used to demonstrate that 
the EU intentionally shapes what is now considered to be normal internationally. What 
Manners was saying, was that the EU, through a set of methods, is able to transfer its ideas 
or norms to the others. Using a set of “diffusional methods” (Manners 2002, p. 244), Manners 
argues that when these ideas are received by the “Other” because they are universal, they 
will become the new normal (Manners 2002). These EU norms are the rule of law, democracy, 
and human rights (Manners 2002). According to Manners, these norms are diffused in the 
international system and when they reach the intended community they will transform and 
shape what would be considered normal in international relations. He argues that, for an idea 
to be received, it has to be justifiable, coherent, and consistent. In EU-AU relations, NPE is 
located in the EU’s foreign policy and contribute to knowledge production. In Africa, NPE is 
visible in declarations, policy documents, and diplomatic speeches issued by top EU officials.  
 
Other studies on  the EU’s position in global politics have gone as far as claiming that the EU 
is unique (Elgström & Smith, 2006; Whitman, 2011) and possesses an extraordinary power, 
“normative power” due to the way it consistently conducts itself around the world (Manners, 
2002; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). The EU’s consistency has sparked enormous debate, with 
scholars suggesting that the EU foreign policies contain a range of inconsistencies (Powel, 
2009; Risse, 2012; Youngs, 2004, 2010). The rationale for choosing NPE as a theoretical 




documents and partnership agreements with its external partners, for example in the Lomé 
and Cotonou as previously discussed. These fundamental principles still exist among African 
countries and, even though the relationship is continuously evolving, these norms remain 
relatively stable and, hence, consistent in every partnership agreement. 
 
The attempt by the EU to export its norms and values dates back to the formation of the 
relationship between the EU-AU and the way the EU tried to interact with the AU (Scheipers 
& Sicurelli, 2008). Even though the EU, or at least some of the member states, had previously 
been involved in Africa by military force (in the colonial era), the second time around the 
relationship was built on its core principles and mainly democratic values. The idea of 
reshaping global norms by changing pre-existing concepts and replacing them with EU norms 
and values forms a cornerstone of the normative power concept. 
 
Manners’ NPE ideas have provoked debates among scholars and faced much criticism in EU 
foreign policy scholarship. Questions on the EU’s actorness, legitimacy, norms over interest, 
and its ability to attract sother are but a few (Sjursen 2006). This chapter is not going to 
address these questions and neither will it entertain a debate on the relevance of NPE, but 
suggests that the core principles of NPE exist in the Treaty of Rome which is the foundation 
to the formation of the EU-AU partnership agreements as recorded in Lomé, Cotonou, and 
JAES.  
 
2.6 The EU as a development aid provider 
 
One of the most important issues for the EU is its desire to assist developing countries to 
achieve sustainable economic and social development. Its foreign policy is persistent on 
equality, prosperity, and poverty reduction. In pursuit of these moral goals, it has dedicated 
its financial and technical resources towards development aid. By the early 2000s, the EU 
accounted for more than half of the worlds foreign aid, making it the biggest aid provider to 
the African continent (Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). With most of 





This ethical move has, however, faced much criticism from international relations scholars. 
Some have even argued that, while the EU tries to help, it has damaged its international 
image. In terms of how the EU uses its development policy in international relations, Maurizio 
Carbone has argued that the EU’s approach of using development policy as a way of asserting 
itself as a global power might have damaged its relationship with African countries (Carbone, 
2011, 2013). Mostly the argument regarding Africa is linked to the EU’s use of political 
conditionality when offering aid. In order to get cooperation from AU member states, the EU 
has included conditionality within its development policy. These political and economic 
conditions are designed to coerce its partners into the adoption of the EU’s core principles, 
as mentioned by Manners (2002, p. 241), namely: “Respect for human rights, democracy, the 
rule of law and good governance.” The EU considers these principles to be a sustainable 
vehicle to poverty reduction. 
 
Carbone (2011) noticed that the EU was providing development aid but in return asking aid 
receivers to adhere to a set of norms as a condition for more development support in the 
future. This framework sparked debate on the future of development due to a conflict of 
interest between the donor and recipient (Scholl, 2009). Because the recipient needed more 
help at a later stage, they would be left with no choice but to adopt these norms and values. 
Over time, these norms have become the new normal. Carbone’s conclusion illustrates how 
the EU deals with the AU. The emphasis on conditionality when negotiating deals has been 
noticed in most EU negotiations with African countries (Fioramonti, 2010; Scheipers & 
Sicurelli, 2008). These conditions are not always palatable to Africans, leading them to look 
for alternative support. Men and Balducci have argued against EU conditionality, citing that 
the EU’s strong emphasis on political conditionality has made them become ineffective in 
implementation of development (2010, p. 1). China has realised this gap and created a model 
different from that of the EU, a move received well by Africans but heavily criticised by the 
West (Men & Balducci, 2010; Men & Barton, 2011). 
 
The view of the EU as a normative power is always highly contested, with consensus on its 
role as a privileged partner in fighting poverty becoming more prominent (Hill & Smith, 2011; 
Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). According to Zielonka (1998), the EU’s development approach is 




2003). These inconsistencies have contributed to the rise of African scepticism, losing faith in 
the European integration project. Since cooperation is one of the keys to a successful 
partnership, the inability to mend the gap is affecting the EU’s ability to assert itself as a global 
power. Trying to bridge the gap of distrust in the model of the EU, development has become 
one of the main tools at the EU’s disposal to maintain its position in the region. Because aid 
for trade is increasingly becoming the preferred foreign policy approach, the EU uses its 
economic muscle to build relations with third countries. This is supported by Lucarelli and 
Fioramonti (2009)’s conclusion that, by becoming a consolidated global player, the EU must 
seriously consider how it performs the duties expected, especially its involvement in aid 
initiatives. 
 
This conclusion is bolstered by the findings of the National Centre for Research on Europe 
(NCRE) on perceptions that the EU has been increasingly recognised as an aid provider in most 
parts of the world but not as a normative power (Björkdahl et al., 2015; Chaban, Elgström & 
Holland, 2006; Sheahan et al., 2010). Aid for trade is one of the main tools used by the EU to 
stay connected with its former colonies (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). This study by the NCRE on 
perceptions contributed an essential component to the studying of EU relations with others, 
as it shows that what the EU tries to achieve is not what the other sees. The EU was not 
regarded as a normative power in Africa, but through its development capacity was 
considered an economic giant and an aid provider (Chaban & Elgström, 2014; Chaban, 
Elgström & Holland, 2006). Based on aid, the relationship between the EU and AU progressed 
significantly, considering it just started as a simple interaction between a donor and aid 
receiver (Farrell, 2007; Hill & Smith, 2011; Rodt & Okeke, 2013). Against this backdrop, the 
EU has adopted and plays the vital role of helping developing countries in the AU to reduce 
poverty. EU development aid has helped to provide basic needs for many, reducing the 
number of people who live in extreme poverty.  
 
Stefania Panebianco has studied the EU’s relationship with AU countries, trying to understand 
the extent to which the EU can act as a norm promoter, especially in areas of human rights 
and democracy(Panebianco 2006) . The research paid attention to sub-Saharan countries that 
were targeted by the EU enlargement. It was evident that there were problems when it comes 




concluded that the EU’s impact in the area of political systems has been unimpressive, but 
there is evidence of recognition in areas of economic development. Even though Panebianco 
analysed only a few countries, the empirical evidence has been similar to the results obtained 
by the NCRE, proving that the EU is perceived as an economic player rather than the 
normative power it tries to portray (Chaban, Elgström & Holland, 2006). The EU’s influence is 
somehow declining (Fioramonti, 2007), making it a weaker partner due to inconsistencies on 
rhetoric versus action. 
 
Even though the EU is recognised as influential in development, as shown by the studies by 
NCRE and other scholars, this does not mean that there are no problems involved. Fioramonti 
(2007) has identified some problems that existed between the EU and Africa. The rise of other 
powers like the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) countries is known to be 
rewarding for other AU countries, as they come with better opportunities which contribute 
to further drift from the EU (Fioramonti, 2017). Using media images to analyse the 
relationship between South Africa (Alden & Schoeman, 2013) and the EU (South Africa is a 
significant economic power in Africa), Fioramonti's concluding remarks were that the EU’s 
image in the region was declining (Fioramonti, 2007). In other terms, if one's image is not 
attractive, it decreases the chances of having an influence and acceptance. This lack of 
influence further complicates the issue of aid coordination and as a result, affects the 
effectiveness of the EU’s effort to reduce poverty. 
 
Since the EU prides itself as a bearer of valuable norms, self-proclaiming cannot be sufficient 
to provide an accurate picture as to what the EU is. In order to verify whether what the EU 
claims is valid, a study on images can help to verify such claims. Ole Elgström's work on the 
images of the EU as portrayed by the “other” suggests mixed responses, indicating the 
existence of a conception-performance and capability-expectation gap, and a failure or 
resistance to adopt the EU norms (Hill, 1993). Some look up to the Union as a saviour, an 
angel, while others see it as a partner with a hidden agenda driven by self-interest (Elgström, 
2008).  
 
The persona of the EU as an inconsistent actor with double standards and friend with ulterior 




is regarded as a partner that is increasingly becoming aggressive and using its economic 
muscle, one which constructs Africans as a problem (Połońska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 
2017). While trade is regarded as key within the EU foreign policy and a way of maintaining 
relations with developing countries, it has been used by EU policy strategists as a tool 
depicting developing countries as inferior (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008, p. 608).  
 
The suggestion that trade will contribute to the reduction of poverty has also been criticised. 
Critics have suggested that “trade accentuates and deepens poverty instead of rectifying and 
diminishing poverty in poor countries” (Bhagwati & Srinivasan, 2002). Claar & Nolke’s 
conclusion on the study of the relationship between the North and South have highlighted 
that relationships based on trade agreements could result in compatibility conflicts (Claar & 
Nölke, 2013, p. 285). Development based on EPAs has resulted in policies unable to work 
universally for many countries at different levels of development. 
 
2.7 A call to strengthening African-EU partnership 
 
By 2005, the relationship between the EU and AU started becoming rocky, which signalled a 
need to introduce a new approach to the troubled affair (Helly, 2013). The problems spanned 
social imbalance; unfair trading attitude towards developing countries; and economic, and 
political bullying (Lilley, 2016). The leaders of the AU complained of the unrealistic reforms 
required when negotiating with the EU and the inequalities which existed in previous 
agreements (Helly, 2013). Aid attached with political conditionality is referenced by 
Fioramonti and Kimunguyi (2011), Fioramonti and Kotsopoulos (2015), Fioramonti  and 
Mattheis (2016), Fioramonti and Poletti (2008) and Men and Barton (2011) as a common 
cause of making Africans uncomfortable and continue to drift away from the partnership 
(Helly, 2013).  
 
Though aid is tied with conditions as a way to curb corruption in Africa, it is also noted that 
aid was also distributed for political reasons (Rimmer, 2000). This did not only create 
problems for Africans, but also created a rift among the EU member states who had an 
interest in the region. With trouble in both camps, the two institutions decided to renegotiate 




the EU-Africa Strategy to help Africa reach the UN MDGs. While aiming to make the world a 
better place, internal problems have crippled the EU and hindered its intention to play its role 
(Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009).  
 
2.8 A new beginning: Entering the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) 
 
In 2007, after negotiations to balance the playing field, the JAES was adopted at the Lisbon 
summit. With more substantial changes in peacebuilding, economic development, and 
sustainable development, the partnership became the cornerstone for a new era enabling 
more cooperation (Helly, 2013). The JAES was instrumental in revitalising African economies 
through EDFs and ODAs and the funding of development projects. Unlike Lomé and Cotonou, 
the JAES is only focused on African countries who collectively form the African Union. 
 
The EU provided loans and funds through the EDF. While intentions were good, the JAES 
project faced criticism as it lacked the spine to withstand bureaucratic pressure, and thereby 
succumbed without yielding further development. The sentiments by the former Senegalese 
president in January 2008, President Abdoulaye Wade, indicated that African leaders were 
considering partners other than the EU. He is on record stating: “China is doing a much better 
job than western capitalists in Africa. The Chinese model for economic development is much 
better for Africa” (Financial Times, 2008). Hackenesch (2015), who assessed the EU-AU 
relations disagrees with those who blame the USA and China as the source of tensions 
between the EU and AU. The hope that the JAES would help remedy the areas which Lomé 
and Cotonou could not address was shuttered. 
 
2.9 Gaps in the Literature 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that there are several problems which exist in the EU-AU 
relationship, which Lomé, Cotonou, and JAES are failing to address. Development aid is not 
enough to solve these problems. Due to the historical relations discussed earlier, Britain has 
strong ties with Africa, and its interest is evident in its contributions towards EDF and separate 
bilateral agreements with Africa outside of the EU. It is against this backdrop that this thesis 




available literature has identified the uncertainties ahead after the expiry of the Cotonou 
agreement. Since there have not been any member states to have ever withdrawn from the 
EU since its inception, there is not enough research to support the prediction that any exit of 
a member state will influence the EU and its foreign relations.  
 
Therefore, the exit of Britain (a significant aid donor) creates an opportunity to study the EU 
in terms of future development and relations. This thesis predicts that the withdrawal of 
Britain from the Union could have severe implications for EU foreign policy and further 
increase the problems affecting the already fractured relationship with the AU. The research 
pays particular attention to the need to reduce poverty as outlined by the EU Global Strategy 





The UK referendum of 2016 which led to the UK leaving the EU has been a blow to the two 
institutions. As for the EU, this means that the EU is losing one of its biggest contributors 
towards the development fund of which much is used in Africa. The UK has been a critical 
player in the area of bringing neighbouring African countries together due to its colonial 
legacies. Without the UK, Africa might not have an incentive to stick by the conditionalities 
that come with EU aid when there are other countries in the region seeking to bond their 
relationship with the institutions.  
 
In the past decade, the EU has been challenged by China and the USA, therefore adding 
another player seeking bilateral relations will increase competition for the EU. In the African 
camp, this might create problems, as African member states are faced with the choice of 
whether to work closely with the UK as a single state or to fight to maintain their relationship 
with the EU. Due to the technical complexities of multi-level and supranational organisations, 
the time required for restructuring and renegotiating existing partnerships can be long. Some 
existing deals would need to be disbanded, which might lead to the conditions of those 










This chapter will delve into the theory and methodology section of this research. First, the 
chapter will introduce the theoretical dimension linking it to the research question. The 
second part will then introduce the methodology of the thesis, outlining how the issue of 
validity concerns, delimitation, terminology, and working definitions for the argument will be 
addressed.  
 
3.1 Theory: Normative Power Europe (NPE) 
 
This paper employs NPE as the theoretical framework to help answer the question: “What 
are the possible implications of Brexit on the EU development agenda in particular on 
eradicating poverty in Africa?” NPE is a theory developed by Ian Manners (2002). This theory 
has been used by many scholars to study the impact of the EU in international relations 
(Elgström & Smith, 2006; Langan, 2014; Nicolaïdis & Whitman, 2013; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 
2008; Whitman, 2011). NPE best fits this study, since the EU has considered Africa a strategic 
external partner from the onset of the European Community and has always used many 
development instruments to promote its norms and values in exchange for development 
assistance. 
 
Manners (2002) argues that the EU has a unique power, one which is neither military nor 
civilian. It is from this ethical approach to foreign policy that he argues that the EU possesses 
a Normative Power. This kind of ideational power has the ability to change and influence what 
is considered normal in international relations. Manners accepts that economic and military 
actions have the ability to influence international politics, but recommends that the EU should 






Manners highlights nine norms which the EU successfully promotes in its external relations. 
He groups these norms in two categories, with the first category qualifying as the core norms. 
The core norms include democracy, human rights, the rule of law, peace, and liberty. The four 
minor norms are: good governance, sustainable development, social solidarity, and anti-
discrimination (Manners, 2002). These fundamental values also form the backbone of the 
Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on EU, Article 2).  The desire to uphold these values and spread them 
around the globe is also emphasised in TEU Article 3: 
 
The Union shall uphold and promote its values and contribute to the protection 
of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development 
of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights 
of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. (TEU, Article 3, para 5).  
. 
The EU’s role is not limited within its member states but is extended to achieve a global 
mandate. All these norms are at the centre of EU development policy and present in the most 
of the partnership agreements between the EU and AU. The JAES predominantly highlights 
the importance of prioritising these principles. The JAES is a partnership between the EU-AU 
which was entered into mainly to deal with African countries outside of the Cotonou 
Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
 
To further show the significance of these norms and values, through its Consensus on 
Development, and the Global Strategy, the EU aims to remain the champion of promoting 
these norms outside of Europe. The EU continues to emphasise the importance of the 
promotion of these core and minor principles by committing itself to help developing 
countries achieve SDGs, as will be explained in detail in the next chapter. It is through the 
implementation of various development activities that the EU acts in a normative character 
(Manners, 2002; Nicolaïdis & Whitman, 2013; Whitman, 2011). The EU believes that its 
involvement in the developing world has helped shape what is now considered normal. 
Though controversial for many as to whether what the EU perceives as normal is good or bad, 
it is undeniable that the EU norms has had an impact. This act by the EU supports Manners’ 




force for good through its initiatives and activities as defined in the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU).  
 
Manners listed six mechanisms through which these norms and values can be diffused 
external to the EU. These mechanisms are contagion, informational, procedural, 
transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filters (Manners, 2002). These mechanisms justify 
how these norms have been able to reach Africa and how they were adopted to create the 
norm. These filters also help answer the questions raised by many scholars as to whether 
these norms are Eurocentric or Universal (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010).  
 
Considering that the first encounter between Europeans and Africans was during 
colonisation, the diffusion mechanisms should offer an explanation as to how the EU 
managed to interact with Africans. These diffusional methods indicate that without the use 
of physical force, cultural filters became a new method of coercion by the EU (Manners, 
2006). The ability to coerce and achieve intended goals, which would have been resisted, 
indicates that the values diffused by the EU were adopted as new norms by external parties. 
 
3.2 Rationale for choosing “Normative Power Europe” 
 
This research uses the NPE theory paradigm as used by other scholars interested in the study 
of EU foreign policy. The results generated from past research indicate that the theory still 
remains relevant in answering questions regarding the EU’s external actorness. The EU’s 
foreign policy is inspired by the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and 
the objective to see successful sustainable development (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014; 
Manners, 2002). The EU’s promotion of NPE values has shaped the EU-AU relationship from 
the early 1950s. An emphasis on these values is active in most of the interactions between 
the EU and AU. Through trade deals and development negotiations, these values always take 
centre stage and through them the EU has been able to maintain a strong position in Africa.  
 
Langan has also found that the EU’s normative principles are embedded within the AU-EU 
relationship (Langan, 2012b). Even though Manners’ arguments do not expressly mention 




as a key to development and as an underlying factor to reduce poverty.  The EU also desires 
the reduction of poverty around the world. The rationale behind aligning this theory with 
development also emanates from the premise that unless there is good governance, respect 
for the rule law and human rights, poverty becomes inevitable.  
 
The EU considers poverty and malnutrition as problems associated with development and as 
a violation of human rights (Khan, 2009). Irene Khan (2009) opines that in order to end 
poverty, human rights should be at the forefront. This means that poverty reduction is closely 
aligned with human rights, therefore all efforts to advance human rights will have an impact 
on poverty. 
 
In the past, there have been improvements in areas of development and the EU has been able 
to influence Africa in many areas and in cases where military action could have been 
detrimental. In pursuit of norms promotion, the EU has been involved in areas of 
development in Africa. Manners’ NPE theory provides the foundation to help explain whether 
the EU will be able to continue its development policy in Africa post-Brexit in particular in the 
area of eradicating poverty, which is one of its priorities as stated in the Treaty, EU Consensus 
on Development and the SDGs and overall in the JAES.  
 
For the purpose of studying EU-AU relations, NPE is appropriate, but for future in-depth EU 
external relations studies, the use of only one theory may not provide conclusive results. 
Manners’ NPE theory offers an explanation of the basis of the EU, but other theories may be 
able to offer something different; however, for the purpose of answering the research 
question, NPE is enough. As mentioned in the first paragraph, NPE has drawn a lot of criticism. 
 
3.3 Criticism of Normative Power Europe 
 
The theory has helped to answer many questions pertaining to the EU’s external action. Yet, 
the theory has also been heavily criticised by many (Diez, 2004,2005,2013; Forsberg, 2011; 
Hyde-Price, 2006; Langan, 2012a; Merlingen, 2007; Staeger, 2016) for different reasons, some 
of the reasons being beyond the scope of this thesis. Of note, is the criticisms regarding 





Critics of NPE have argued that the EU norms cannot be universal as they promote Eurocentric 
ideas (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010). The notion of legitimacy of the EU’s actions is debated widely 
as some researchers have argued that these EU norms are adopted in certain geographic 
areas but are not seen to exist in other parts of the world (Chaban et al., 2015). The argument 
is that the EU is viewed as a normative power by its closest neighbours, while it is only viewed 
as an economic power in other parts of the world without any trace of norms (Björkdahl et 
al., 2015). In Africa, the EU has been dominant in areas of economic power with less 
recognition as a normative power. Another criticism is that theorising the EU as a normative 
power undermines the EU’s foreign policy interests. Critics argue that there is a conflict of 
interest and values (Diez, 2005).  
 
For others, the “Other,” the norm recipient’s role and desires are missing in Manners’ theory. 
While the norms and values are diffused through the six diffusional methods, the theory 
undermines the importance of other partners who are supposed to adopt those values. The 
recipient is equally important in the debate, but Manners’ NPE did not discuss this 
phenomenon. As found by the NCRE research on perceptions, the recipients who were 
expected to see the EU as a norm provider actually considered the EU as a mere aid provider 
(Chaban, Elgström & Holland, 2006). 
 
Thomas Diez disagrees with Manners and thinks that NPE is self-constructed. Diez sees the 
concept of depicting the EU as a normative power as problematic because the other actor is 
completely neglected. He sees this idea as self-centred and thinks NPE as a self-righteous 
project which create a gap between the European and the Others. Diez raises a powerful 
argument that NPE only pays attention to regarding the EU’s actorness, undermining the 
effect this might have on the other. This position will be explored further in this research in 
trying to examine and understand whether the EU’s pursuing of norms promotion might have 
impacted the AU negatively and whether that could affect its ambitions in African post-Brexit. 
 
The ideas of NPE cannot be judged effective unless it can be proven that the EU has the power 
to do the things it says its capable of doing outside its borders. When analysing the 




its foreign policy is two-faced. The EU seeks to be viewed as a normative power but it also 
endeavours to further its economic interests and wishes to influence the political spheres in 
the region (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010). 
 
If ever NPE is going to be put to the test, Africa is the best case study to investigate this claim. 
As discussed earlier, AU-EU relations started early in the 1950s and the relationship has 
evolved with time, forcing regular changes to adapt to the changing geopolitics. What has not 
changed, is the EU’s interest in the continent and the EU’s claims that it purely continues to 
promote its norms and values. Though the EU intentions in Africa are highly contested, the 
AU has been a privileged partner benefiting most from the EU funding compared to any other 




This section introduces the research methodology used to answer the main research 
question: What are the possible implications of Brexit on the EU’s poverty reduction 
agenda in Africa? It aims to introduce the reasons for selecting a specific method – 
qualitative analysis through the study of official EU documents -- and outlines the research 
strategy introduced in order to answer the main research question and sub questions.  
  
In order to address the main research question, a set of sub-questions will help to untangle 
the historical, contextual, and other factors that can contribute to challenging the EU 
development agenda post-Brexit. These sub-questions are:  
 
1.    Historically, was the relationship between the EU and AU guided by the EU’s 
normative power framework? 
2.    What are the EU’s goals for the AU regarding poverty eradication? 
3.    What role does Britain play in the EU’s development policy towards the AU? 





Because this research aims to examine how successful has been the EU’s poverty reduction 
in Africa? and what are the possible implications of Brexit in this agenda?, a qualitative 
approach was chosen as the appropriate method.  
Qualitative research methods are mostly used in political science studies and are reliable for 
small samples. The qualitative approach helps to analyse relationship structures and themes 
which are sometimes not detectable in international relations. It allows the researcher to 
explore and understand individuals or groups who hold a certain belief (Creswell & Creswell, 
2018). In most cases, conclusions of qualitative research are the result of the researcher’s 
own interpretations and judgements. This research has focused on analysing primary 
sources, the JAES partnership agreement, AU reports, press releases and evaluation reports, 
all of which determine whether the EU’s poverty reduction desire is possible without the 
UK, since the UK is one of the major actors in EU development. The JAES was designed to 
provide African solutions to African problems. The signing of the JAES was meant to be a 
partnership which placed focus only on African partners, unlike the Cotonou Agreement 
which included countries from the Pacific and the Caribbean.  
 
The JAES was regarded as a hallmark by both the AU and EU as it outlined principles of 
partnership. One of its main principles is human development which fights for equality, 
reduction of poverty, better education for all, economic growth, and, zero tolerance to 
hunger and discrimination. JAES documents are essential to this study since it is the current 
partnership agreement which offers the AU exclusive attention. The period of study is 
limited to the inception of the JAES in 2007 until 2018. This longitudinal approach sets a 
clear timeframe to look at the progress of the partnership.  Even though the EU-AU relations 
were formalised in 1957 through the Rome treaty, they were revised many times by the 
signing of other treaties, namely Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou. This thesis will not seek to 
evaluate these previous partnerships in detail, but will only focus on the JAES partnership, 
which came into effect in 2007. This is because the desire to eradicate poverty in Africa is at 
the centre of the JAES, and an analysis of the Action Plans will help to summarise the 
effectiveness of this partnership and whether it has managed to address the need to 





While the JAES was still in force, the African Union agreed on their own fifty-year plan. In 
the bid to succeed in areas of development, the AU at continental level produced its own 
Agenda 2063, which is reinforced by and aligned with the SDGs. Because the SDGs are 
aligned with the EU agenda and now with the Africa’s Agenda 2063, SDG reports are 
analysed in this research in order to gauge if there has been any progress in the effort to 
reduce poverty. To get a report with a balanced view, UNDP’s SDG reports are a good 
source as they arguably offer a neutral viewpoint.  
  
To increase the validity of this research, secondary sources were utilised in the form of 
journal articles, books, scholarly work from other researchers, news articles, and NGOs 
reports. Since the EU operates in partnership with NGOs to implement projects, NGO 
reports, such as those from Oxfam and Save the Children have been reviewed, offering up 
to date information on the current levels of poverty. To compliment the information 
obtained from these secondary sources, publicly available online information from the EU 
websites has made information verification easy. These online documents from the EU are 
useful for giving an indication of how much Britain has been contributing toward Africa 
through the EDF and ODAs. The involvement and individual contribution of the UK towards 
the EU development, both financially and technically, is important in this research. 
 
Finally, secondary sources from authoritative researchers, such as those canvassed in the 
literature review, who have spent a lot of time researching EU development at a broad level 
other than poverty contribute significantly to this thesis. These experts have been able to 
complete research and offer recommendations to the EU that led to foreign policy reforms 
in the past, making their literature a reliable source of information. This thesis takes that 
useful information, together with our own analysis to provide important and useful insights 
into how Brexit may impact EU-AU relations going forward. 
 
3.5 Definitions of terms. 
 




•    The EU institutions, particularly the main institutional actors involved in the EU’s 
development policy, namely the European Commission and the EU member states. (Orbie et 
al., 2017) 
 
African Union (AU) 
•   The AU institutions, particularly the main institutional actors, the Commission of the 
African Union and the AU member states. 
 
Brexit 
•    The withdrawal of the UK from the European Union as a result of a referendum outcome 




Poverty has traditionally been defined and measured in monetary terms. If one lives below 
the $1.90 per day threshold, he or she is deemed to be living in poverty. Research by Alkire, 
Kanagaratnam and Suppa (2018) has shown that poverty can take different forms and should 
be broadly defined to cover areas such as education, health, housing, human empowerment, 
employment, and personal security. They state: “No one indicator, such as income, is uniquely 
able to capture the multiple aspects that contribute to poverty” (Alkire, Kanagaratnam & 
Suppa, 2018). All the aspects of poverty which are taken into consideration for this thesis are 
listed in the table below. 
 








While this research seeks to provide a clear picture of the implications of Brexit on the EU’s 
poverty reduction efforts in Africa, there are some limitations. Firstly, Brexit negotiations are 
still underway, so the conclusion of the research is drawn from explicit assumptions. Brexit 
has not yet happened and is expected to complete in October 2019. The thesis only pays 
attention to only one particular area of development, namely poverty reduction, though the 
EU is involved in many different aspects of development in the region (for example, issues of 
peace and security, trade and political development). The research also critically analyses the 
JAES and to a lesser extent the Cotonou partnership agreement, though there are other 
partnerships currently in place at bilateral level managed by each respective member state.  
 
This thesis is limited to the area of development, in particular the areas outlined in the SDGs. 
Goal number one of the SDGs has inspired this research, but the EU is involved in trying to 
achieve all seventeen goals. This thesis acknowledges the impact of the individual EU member 
states who are actively involved at a bilateral level in Africa, as their involved might have a 
positive effect on development, but those achievements are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Other actors like the UN, China and the US are also active in the region, but their impact is 
also beyond the scope of this research. Finally, since Brexit is a new phenomenon, there is 
not enough academic literature to support the conclusion, but the build-up is supported by 















In order to understand EU development policy in Africa and its potential impact on poverty 
reduction, Chapter 4 begins by providing a working definition of poverty and outlines the 
parameters by which one could be identified as living in poverty. In this way, it will become 
clear what is meant by “poverty reduction” and this is followed by some poverty related 
figures gathered by the UN. These figures show the number of people currently living in 
poverty in Africa is high, although there has been some inroads. These figures illustrate that 
poverty is an issue that needs to be addressed and the number of the most affected are in 
Africa. Using data from the UN reports allows this research to work with reliable and up to 
date information. The EU relies on the figures published by the UN in most of its planning. 
Most of the EU’s reports always reference other multilateral organisations like the World 
Bank and the UN as a partner in fighting poverty. This Chapter will also the mechanism which 
was decided to be fit to fight and reduce such high level of poverty. 
 
4.1 Determining if one is considered to be in poverty: Poverty Indicators 
 
The UN outlines poverty in terms of three key areas: health, education, and living standards. 
This definition is used in this research as it streamlines and identifies critical areas of poverty. 
As illustrated in the below table, these areas are then grouped into different specific target 
areas and conditions necessary for one to be labelled as living in poverty. Efforts to reduce 
poverty should be given top priority as projections indicate that by 2020 over 500 million in 
Africa will be food insecure (USDA, 2010). Against this context, Africa is continuously at risk 















   
Health Nutrition If an adult under age 70 years or child is undernourished. 
 Child mortality If any child died in a family in the five-year period preceding the 
survey. 
Education Years of Schooling If no family member aged 10 or older has completed six years of 
schooling. 
 School attendance If any school-aged child is not attending schooling up to the age at 
which the child completes class 8. 
Standard of 
Living 
Cooking Fuel If a household cooks with dung, wood, charcoal or coal. 
 
 Sanitation If a household uses alternative sanitation facilities not improved to 
international standards as stated by SDG guidelines or if shared 
with two or more households. 
 
 Drinking Water If a household does not have access to clean and safe drinking 
water. 
 Electricity If a household has no electricity. 
 
 Housing If the housing materials for at least one of roof, walls and floor are 
inadequate or are from rudimentary materials. 
 
 Assets If a household does not own a radio, TV, telephone, computer, 
animal cart, bicycle, motorbike or refrigerator, and does not own 
a car or truck. 
 
 
 Source: Human Development Report 2018 
 
 Where do most of the people in poverty live? 
 
According to the UN Human Development Report, the number of people living in poverty is 
increasing, and most of them are from Africa. The 2018 report, as illustrated in Figure 6 below, 
indicates that at least 1.3 billion people in the world live in poverty. Of these people living in 
acute poverty, the highest percentage (42%) is from sub-Saharan Africa. Over half a million 





   
 Figure 2: Human Development Poverty Report 2018 
Source: Human Development Report, 2018. 
 
The UN identified deprivation as a lack of education, unemployment, poor health, and poor 
living standards such as not having clean water, sanitation, and adequate nutritious food. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, children are the most vulnerable to poverty. Figure 3 shows the 
intensity of child poverty by region. In the graph, Africa hosts the highest number of children 
living without education or proper health services and in poor living conditions (GMPI, 2018) 
 
 
Figure 3: Intensity of Multidimensional Poverty Index: Child Poverty by Region 
 Source: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2018. 
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Figure 4 provides broken down data by country. While most of the poor children live in Africa, 
some countries are more vulnerable than others (Alkire, Kanagaratnam & Suppa, 2018). To 
alleviate poverty, most countries rely on agriculture for GDP growth, employment and 
agriculture supplies for people’s livelihoods. A report by the world bank in 2008 reported that 
agriculture was twice as effective at alleviating poverty in Africa as trade (World Bank, 2008). 
The EU has been on the forefront advocating for better practices in agriculture, governance, 









  Figure 4: Where do the 559 million poor people in sub-Sahara Africa live? 
Source: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2018. 
 
African countries remain top of the ladder of countries with extreme poverty. It is in this 
region where the EU is striving to reduce poverty in order to leave no one behind. This is part 
of the EU’s consensus on development and one of the main principles outlined in the JAES 
partnership and the reason for incorporating CAADP in the agreement. The AU countries 
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the EU and UK for exports. Agricultural produce from countries like Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Kenya and Mozambique and natural resources from Ethiopia and Niger are also mostly sold 
in the EU yet these countries are the most affected by poverty. 
 
In a press statement released on January 22, 2018, the data produced by the Oxford Poverty 
and Human Development initiative found that 48% of Angola’s population still lives in 
extreme poverty (OPHI, 2018). Angola has a population of over 29,7 million people and of 
that number almost half are deprived of education, health, and better living conditions. 
Angola is one of the countries who relies on export to the EU countries for GDP growth and 
has been receiving more aid to alleviate poverty but has remained unmanageable. 
 
As emphasised in a European report on development 2012 stated, “the rate at which the 
world population is growing, by 2030 demand for food, water and energy is expected to rise 
by 30-40 %”(EU Commission, 2012). This growth in population not only affects developing 
countries in Africa but will also put pressure on Europe, hence an added need to collaborate 
with developing nations to help reduce its possible effects. In the remaining part of this 
chapter, the following sub-question is addressed: “What framework drives the current EU-AU 
development relationship?” Answering this question will help to unpack the nuances tied in 
the current relationship and outlines some essential details associated with the EU’s poverty 
reductions strategy. This is answered by analysing the NPE framework and complimented by 
the analysis of the JAES.  
 
4.2 Joint Africa -European Strategy to fight poverty 
 
In December 2007, the EU entered into a new strategic partnership with the AU to addresses 
concerns regarding lack of ownership in areas of common interest (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). This 
political framework, on top of the Cotonou agreement, drives the EU-AU relationship 
differently than in the past. The JAES partnership is based on shared objectives and mutual 
benefits and risks. This new strategy was the first to represent long-term goals between the 
two organisations while creating open and co-ownership projects exclusively focused on the 





•    To enhance EU-AU political dialogue  
•    Promotion of peace and security and help to achieve MDGs  
•    Effective Multilateralism  
•    Creating a people-centred partnership 
 
As is traditional with all EU agreements, the so-called “norms and values”(Manners, 2002) 
take centre stage in the partnership agreements, and the JAES starts with just that. The JAES 
partnership agreement state that: 
 
Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common 
future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, 
freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined 
in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our 
respective Unions. (Council of European Union 2007)  
 
The extract above suggests that the EU_AU relationship has its roots in ethical motives as 
Manners’ NPE claimed. The partnership acknowledges historical experiences as the key 
(Fioramonti & Mattheis, 2016), but the current challenges presented by ever-evolving global 
politics call for both parties to acknowledge these changes, as they have the potential to 
undermine addressing the root causes of poverty. The EU can no longer rely on this historical 
colonial linkage, as the AU member states now seem to be driven by pan-Africanism rhetoric, 
regional relations, and generational self-interest. The two continents participating in the 
agreement emphasise designing mechanisms that can mitigate poverty. The documents on 
the partnership also outline that the two institutions share a vision and common purpose to 
achieve the SDGs. 
 
The JAES partnership was built on principles of equal partnership, emphasising the aim to 
achieve SDGs, cooperation, and human development. Unlike in the past, the AU has teamed 
up to become assertive when negotiating trade deals, which makes them an unbreakable 
union. Implementation of the JAES Action Plans was jointly conducted by moving away from 
the traditional aid-based projects, bringing together a wider sphere of stakeholders, including 
civil society and international organisations. The call for equal partnership that brings the two 





This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and 
Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of 
sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, 
prosperity, solidarity and human dignity. (Council of European Union, 2007) 
 
Implementation of the JAES Action Plans or Roadmaps focused on different aspects of human 
development, trade, and economic and political dialogue. The action plans outline the 
importance of aligning the partnership with the SDGs, as the EU aims to help developing 
countries achieve these goals. In a perfect world, the JAES was intended to bridge the 
inequality gap by addressing common concerns. In order to have a system of checks and 
balances, the partnership incorporated civil society actors, moving towards an effective 
multilateralism. As shown in table 2, the partnership objectives are implemented through 
action plans targeting a few specific areas of development at a given time. The EU manages 
its foreign policy through the European External Service Action (EEAS) to help developing 
countries achieve sustainable development. The first action plan was implemented in 2008-
2010, the second plan in 2011-2013 and the other in 2014-2017.  
 
4.3 The Implementation of the JAES 
 
The following chapters will explaine the JAES, its main pillars and the EU foreign policy 
strategy and how the EU interacts with the rest of the World (Flint, 2008; Helly, 2013; Rimmer, 
2000). It also highlighted that the EU holds a prestigious position as the biggest aid provider 
(Elgström, 2007; Elgström & Smith, 2006; Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 
2008), therefore the EU’s goal to reduce poverty in Africa is possible if the implementation 
process is refined. On the flip side, this position can potentially be compromised by the 
departure of Britain from the EU – as the UK is the biggest contributor towards the EU EDF 
budget.  
 
4.4 The EU’s other policy Implementation Instruments 
 
The EU uses many of its financial instruments in dealings with the AU. The implementation of 




complications of using different types of instruments to address poverty have not spared the 
EU. Beneficial to this thesis, these instruments contributes by providing an insight on the 
progress and outcomes of the action plans. The JAES projects were carried out through the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF), the 
Partnership Instruments, the European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDH), 
the Instrument for Stability and Humanitarian Aid (ISHA), and Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Besides working at the 
EU level, individual member states also contribute further assistance towards development 
using different tools. These various instruments by the EU and the member states, instead of 
being helpful to the implementation of action plans, have contributed to inconsistences and 
incoherence, leading to shortcomings in policy output. 
 
In order to demonstrate clearly with data, the thesis relies on information in the EU external 
development reports, from these deferent instruments, Civil Society Organisations, 
International Organisations, EU financial institutions and development instruments directed 
to non-EU countries but Africa in particular. Figure 5, compiled with data from the OECD 
website, provides detailed information on the world’s top contributors towards the ODA. As 
demonstrated, the EU holds over half of the world’s ODA contributions, of which most of it is 
used to help countries in African, Caribbean and Pacific to fight poverty and hunger. To fight 
poverty, the EU applies different projects, which are managed by the Commission and funded 
through the EDF. However, as the EU does not carry these projects themselves, they rely on 






Figure 5: Share Total ODA to Africa 2015 
Source: OECD 
 
4.5 Pillar 1: The Importance of Political dialogue in policy implementation 
 
Despite these financial contributions by the EU, the EU has a big task ahead to fulfil its 
commitments as promised to the AU through the JAES. As described in the theoretical 
framework, the EU takes pride in advocating for peace and security (Manners, 2002). The first 
pillar of the JAES, as shown in Table 2, demonstrates that same desire to strengthen the EU-
AU political relationship. Due to historical ties, the EU has always been interested in helping 
African countries in areas of good governance. The JAES collaboration did help to address 
areas of common concern (relationship based on equal ownership) for both the EU and AU 
outside the Cotonou Agreement. A continent-to-continent dialogue is the first step to create 
stronger ties which could lead to future cooperation in other areas and especially in human 
development. Through several summits (namely-Lisbon 2007, Tripoli  2010, Brussels 2014 and 
Abidjan 2017), the heads of state from both sides met to discuss the Action Plans. In addition 
to these summits, political dialogues took place at ministerial level on specific political 
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of action. Since the heads of state summits happened at three year intervals, the ministerial 
level meetings were designed to address grassroots problems, implementation and provide 
the road map for future goals.  As indicated by the results in Table 2, the 2014-2017 action 
plans have suffered from lack of a political cooperation, which led to poor outcome when 
progress on pillar 1 was assessed and in turn negatively impacts in areas of poverty reduction. 
The assessment shows that there is a communication deficit between the EU and the AU 
which leads to failure in political dialogue. Our analysis of these findings is that without a 
proper dialogue and engagement, it is difficult to achieve and maintain a partnership. The 
head of states and ministerial meetings had been criticised as dominated by EU agenda rather 
than focusing on the issue that matters to both. The inconsistences and disconnect in these 
dialogues have contributed to poor success. In order to achieve the poverty reduction agenda, 
there is needed to self-reflect otherwise the intended poverty reduction agenda will fail. 
 
4.6 Pillar 2: The accomplishment of SDGs 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the EU’s desire to help reduce poverty in all its forms and 
dimensions in Africa is also enshrined in the consensus for development. In 2005, the EU, at 
the Union and bilateral level, committed itself to see through in favour of poverty reduction 
(Consensus on Development, 2005). On 20 December 2005, the EU further signed the MDGs 
(now SDGs) to affirm its commitment to development. According to the EU, poverty is “an act 
when people of any gender are deprived and perceived as incapacitated in society” (European 
Commission, 2005). The inconsistences experienced through the MDGs led to the creation of 
a more refined and effective framework: SDGs. The SDGs offered a comprehensive and 
covered a broader area of issues. The SDGs consists of 17 areas focused on ending poverty, 
reduce inequalities and tackling climate change. They are more comprehensive, as they call 
for action from all countries to contributing towards ending poverty and address climate 
change concerns, unlike the MDGs which were only focused on developing countries. The 
SDGs also seek to further the scope of the MDGs to address the root causes of poverty by 
addressing the issues of economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. 
Throughout the JAES document, SDGs are repeated many times to emphasis the importance 




acts of deprivations can take the form of human, political, economic, socio-cultural, and 
protective capabilities. As noted in the Consensus Document: 
 
This Declaration states loud and clear that the European Union is united in the 
fight against world poverty and that it has not given up on achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals, on the contrary! (Consensus on Development, 
2005) 
 
This introduction by the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid 
clearly outlines the EU’s fight towards a better world. A world where everybody is equal and 
a world free of poverty, a “normative” vantage point. NPE is actively in the centre of the 
Consensus and shaping the EU’s dealings with the AU is the desire to see a successful 
eradication of poverty. 
 
Combating poverty is stressed in the first sentence of the consensus. The EU took upon itself 
the mandate to help develop third world countries. For the EU, poverty reduction is a moral 
obligation that needs to be initiated at the EU level. 
 
Never before have poverty eradication and sustainable development been more 
important… Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also 
help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world. (Consensus 
on Development, 2005) 
 
The rhetoric from the excerpt above, as documented in the European Consensus for 
Development, suggests that the EU’s commitment to saving the starving children in 
developing countries goes beyond just a moral obligation to the EU norms and values. The EU 
considers its development policy as a tool that can remedy the growing numbers of poverty, 
reduce HIV/AIDS, reduce conflicts and help create sustainable jobs. This idea of positioning 
the EU as a global champion pursuing liberal norms rather than military action international 
relations formulates the NPE paradigm narrative. Most people in developing countries survive 
under a dollar per day, and over a billion people die every year from communicable diseases. 
In response to these challenges, the introduction of the SDGs and aligning them with the 





The SDGs goals aim to:  
 
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce the mortality rate of 
children; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for 
development. (UNDP,2015) 
 
All these goals listed by the UN in the SDGs are what inspired the JAES. The aim of the EU is 
to see success to these goals which is why they are included in many of the EU agreements 
and the in particular the JAES. 
 
Amidst these developments, the EU emphasises the importance of cooperation by the 
member states in achieving these ambitious results. This comprehensive EU Consensus 
document encompasses diverse areas of development. The common factor of the JAES is 
based on mechanisms that can lead to fully achieving the SDGs and reducing poverty. In the 
JAES documents, the EU norms and values take centre stage and are considered and agreed 
upon by the AU. These SDGs forms the backbone when discussing poverty. As most of the 
SDGs are considered universal or norms of the EU, in particular, human rights, democracy, 
good governance and rule of law, many AU leaders have been relucted to fully commit. This 
lagging behind has contributed to a weak success in this area. 
 
4.7 Pillar 3: Creating an Effective Multilateralism 
 
As part of the Action Plans, the EU has committed financial support for JAES development 
projects. Financial support has remained the central feature of most of the EU partnership 
deals and the JAES. JAES relations were meant to be an equal partnership, but in reality, the 
EU utilised its financial support instruments to drive the Action Plans while keeping the donor-
recipient framework which many have criticised, as it supports the AU to continue to be 
dependent on Europe (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). The EU remains the main contributor towards 
the JAES roadmaps. This has created AU dependency behaviour on the EU. The AU member 




member states’ default in contributions means the AU cannot always meet the agreed 
funding budget on programs. In turn, the EU covers all the programs and provides aid. For a 
successful completion of these Action Plans in Table 1, the AU needs to step up, otherwise 
the poverty reduction project will not yield any fruitful results. The lack of well-structured 
financial commitment from the EU has also led to failure in accomplishing the action plans. 
 
As the JAES aims to move away from this dependency framework, in order to address the 
issue of poverty by ensuring that all the SDGs are met, the AU has an obligation to provide 
funding towards the financing of the action plans. For the first time in the history of EU 
partnership agreements with Africa, non-state actors were also invited to participate in 
discussions based on shared interests, a consensus of values, and common concerns. These 
CSOs are vital for poverty reduction as they are the vehicle to coordinate programmes on the 
ground. The inclusion of civil society within the JAES to ensure implementation of the action 
plans created an open, clear, and transparent playing field. The CSOs were to play watchdog, 
advocate, monitor and evaluate roles and take a neutral position in political dialogue. The EU 
continues to use the EDF as the primary tool to support development in the region but funding 
provided to the AU for the  programs required the AU to inject a contribution to avoid a total 
EU funding on projects, avoiding further dependency. The introduction of the African Union 
Support Programme 111, which started in 2016, had a budget of 51 million euro, of which 
85% was contributions from the EU and 15% from the AU. This budget went towards the 
support of SDGs, an initiative received well by many as it tackled poverty at a time when the 
percentage rate of poverty was growing compared to the 2011 percentage. Still with this 
financial commitment, nuances of conditionality are blamed as the catalyst to failure. 
 
At a bilateral level, the EU uses the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) when dealing 
with individual states, like the EU-South Africa, EU-Kenya, and EU-Ghana interaction. The 
objective of the DCI is to complement other EU programmes, ensuring sustainable 
development mainly in areas of peace and security, democracy, good governance, respect for 
human rights, sustainable development, human development, continental integration, and 
people-centred partnership, but its main purpose is poverty reduction. At a continent level, 
the DCI has led to the formation of the Pan African Programme (PanAF) in 2014, which covers 




euro directed at poverty reduction. The creation of the PanAf is a direct response to the 
complaints by the AU and EU that the success of the JAES should be based on cooperation 
and commitment from both sides. The DCI instrument therefore works to complement other 
EU external programmes to support Africa to reduce poverty. Having many instruments to 
compliment JAES helps to determine whether the JAES has had an influence on poverty at all.  
 
4.9 Pillar 4: People-to-People based partnership 
 
The response to repeated criticism from the AU has led to the formation of this JAES 
agreement to address the concern of inequalities and discrimination. Both parties agreed 
there should be a joint strategy co-owned by both the EU and AU. Successful political dialogue 
is the first step in ensuring people’s needs become the centre of all partnerships. 
 
People-to-people relationships are the cornerstone for the PanAf, and the two continents 
hope to promote this in almost all negotiations. The resolutions of the EU-AU Abidjan Summit 
in November 2017 emphasise the importance of prioritising SDGs to ensure economic, and 
social development on equal terms. This approach is also extensively covered in the European 
Consensus for Development, which is aligned to the SDGs. The adoption of the SDGs is a 
testament to this desire to invest in a people-focused strategy. 
 
The JAES’ emphasis on human rights as a top priority seeks to address the inequality gap.  
Through several programmes and collaborations focused on human rights, the JAES 
programmes were able to address poverty root causes. In collaboration with EU and AU 
member states, but driven mostly by the EU, respect for human rights is vital and contributes 
directly towards the completion of SDGs with desired results. In addition, Africa created the 
Agenda 2063, which is a blueprint plan that aims to help deliver the SDGs and a better future 
life for the African people. These SDGs remain the focus for the JAES, Agenda 2063 and the 
new EU Global Strategy.  
 
Economic growth, social development and poverty reduction take centre stage of the three 
policies addressed above (JAES, Agenda 2063 and EUGS). Poverty is one of the main problems 




starvation and other areas identified as root causes for poverty through the JAES action plans. 
These actions plans, cited on Table 1, target different key areas and root causes for extreme 
poverty. Against this backdrop, the UK has been vocal in advocating for reform in agriculture 
policies. Agriculture is one of the areas which provides income and food to many people in 
Africa. In order to empower small agriculture practitioners, the EU partners in the area of 
agriculture with financial and technical support. A Comprehensive African Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP), as a branch of NEPARD, was established with the help of 
the UK to contribute to the efforts to provide food security, curb international 
marginalisation, and alleviate poverty in Africa. Addressing these root causes is in line with 
the JAES being en route to achieving all the SDGs. 
 
4.9.1 Overall Analysis of the JAES 
 
This section of the thesis now focuses on the analysis of the JAES documents discussed in the 
previous sections. The analysis will begin by analysing the main document, the JAES 
partnership agreement. To perfectly offer a good analysis, the Table 1 below provides an 
assessment of the JAES partnership agreement and the action plans agreed between the EU 
and AU for 2014 - 2017. These action plans are essential to the JAES as they are drivers 
towards poverty reduction. The table evaluates the action plans’ progress. 
 
 In some areas, like peace and security, the EU has remained a crucial partner as a financial 
provider. Technically, there are still problems associated with the fragmentation and lack of 
focus on capacity building. The main contributing factor to most of the shortcomings, is the 
EU’s inability to find a common ground to initiate productive political dialogue. The JAES 
agreement considers all of the partnership goals fundamental to poverty reduction therefor 
any failure to deliver in any of these areas is detrimental to the goal. Overall, the analysis 
indicates that there are many problems experienced in other target areas and these issues 
hamper the EU’s delivery on poverty reduction. The EU continues to suffer from incoherence, 
inconsistence and ineffectiveness. The mechanisms designed to drive the JAES action plans 
are not enough for sufficient economic growth, poverty reduction and job creation. The 





Table 2: JAES Partnership and Plans: 2014-2017 Assessment 
  
Partnership Action Plan Assessment 2014-2017 
Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security 
 
• Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security;  
• Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture;  
• Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support 
Operations. 
 
Full operationalisation hampered by still insufficient 
absorption capacity, accountability and mobilisation of 
own resources by African partners. Complexity and 
fragmentation of EU funding and insufficient focus on 
capacity-building  
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Democratic 
Governance and Human Rights 
 
• Enhance dialogue at global level and in international 
fora;  
• Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and 
support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance; 
•  Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods. 
 
Securitisation of the migration agenda and divergences 
over human rights and international criminal justice 
have reinforced the African perception of a one-way 
dialogue. Efforts towards enhanced policy dialogue 
jeopardised by insufficient communication and 
coordination.	 
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Trade, Regional 
Integration and Infrastructure 
 
• Support the African integration agenda;  
• Strengthen African capacities in the area of rules, 
standards, and quality control;  
• Implement the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership. 
 
Limited contribution to concrete achievements (i.e. in 
trade and market integration).  
Focus on technology, but no push for necessary effort in 
the regulatory domain  
 
 
Africa-EU Partnership on the Sustainable 
Developments Goals 
 
• Ensure the finance and policy base for achieving the 
SDGs; 
• Accelerate the achievement of the Food Security 
Targets of the SDGs; 
•  Accelerate the achievement of the Health Targets of 
the SDGs; 
• Accelerate the achievement of the Education Targets of 
the SDGs.  
 
 
EU support to some specific institutional initiatives. 
Weak as a cross-cutting issue and conditionality.  
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Energy 
 
• Implement the Energy Partnership to intensify 
cooperation on energy security and energy access. 
 
Limited regional-based initiatives. Lack of an overall 
architecture.  
Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change 
 
• Build a common agenda on climate change policies and 
cooperation;  
• Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing 
aridity, including the "Green Wall for the Sahara 
Initiative". 
 
Emphasis on the use of development funding for climate 
change, but action is so far too focused on mitigation 
and does not covers sufficiently adaption and 
environment protection.  
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility 
and Employment 
 
• Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Conference on 
Migration and Development; 
• Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of 
Human Beings;  
• Implement and follow up the 2004 Ouagadougou 
Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and 
Poverty Alleviation in Africa. 
 
Prioritised, but as a European short-run interest without 
close attention to local needs and to long-term 
challenges related to poverty eradication.  
 
Africa-EU Partnership on Science, Information 
Society and Space 
 
• Support the development of an inclusive information 
society in Africa;  
• Support S&T Capacity Building in Africa and Implement 
Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of 
Action;  
• Enhance cooperation on space applications and 
technology. 
 








4.9.2 Challenges towards the JAES success 
 
The historical interaction between the EU and the AU can be described as unique in a sense 
because of the difficulties and successes they experienced together. As stated throughout 
this essay and supported by the introduction of the JAES, the relationship dates back to a time 
when Africa was heavily dependent on the EU. Using different development tools, the EU 
managed to inspire the formation of the AU. The AU has emulated the EU, leading to the 
formation of a similar style organisation in order to bring regional cooperation. Such an 
outcome ties with the NPE concept of transference of norms and values, which has offered 
the theoretical explanation to the study of EU-AU relations.  
 
Past encounters between the EU and AU also experienced some challenges, and these 
challenges affect the current relationship. The AU is hesitant to fully trust the EU for a variety 
of reason, particularly when it comes to issues of state sovereignty. This is also evident in the 
JAES assessment (table 1), which show that the AU perceive the EU as a negotiating partner 
with protectionist tendencies. The AU member states are suspicious of EU motives and fear 
the EU’s interference in state politics.  While the JAES meant to break this concern, there are 
still elements of mistrust in the AU member states who feel this partnership is another 
attempt by the EU to interfere. It is from this angle that the UK has been vital in facilitating 
dialogue between the two institutions. The UK is regarded as a better partner, mainly due to 
its past references in development. Without the UK in the middle to facilitate dialogue, the 
EU-AU partnership objectives as outlined in the JAES face difficulties. 
 
The EU is not only disadvantaging themselves by not addressing Africa immediately on the 
way forward post-Brexit, but they risk losing ground to competitors like China, India and 
possibly the UK. Even though the EU 28 (27 post-Brexit) remain Africa’s significant political 
and economic partner, the EU would need to work hard to improve their competitive 
advantage to counter the growing influence of other actors (Fioramonti & Kotsopoulos, 
2015). Chinese influence in areas of infrastructure development in Africa has already created 
tensions between the EU and AU. The development model offered by the Chinese does not 




interfere with national sovereignty (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). This creates a scenario where the 
EU will not be able to coordinate development tools as efficiently as they did in the past. If 
that happens, that interrupts the existing channels that address poverty reduction.   
 
While the AU appreciates this Chinese development strategy, it is perceived by the EU to 
challenge their influence in areas of political and economic development. On the other hand, 
Russia has been involved in development with the AU member states. In 2012, Russia spent 
at least 2 million US dollars on African development initiatives. Other countries like India and 
Brazil have joined forces as the BRICS countries to assist in areas of development in Africa. 
Though the EU remains a big donor, it has lost some of its traction, influence, and leadership 
role in the area of development (Helly, 2013). Helly argues that the only a donor-recipient 
relationship exists between the two institutions, but both have agreed to disagree on other 
matters, including development issues (Helly, 2013). 
 
4.9.3 Summary  
 
The results drawn from the roadmap’s assessment are somewhat varied. Areas of political 
engagement remain unclear and cannot provide a clear picture of progress. A lack of trust 
from the AU and lack of commitment by some of the AU heads of state who claim that 
partnership with EU threatens their state sovereignty is slowing down progress. Political 
leaders keep on pursuing political agendas at the expense of vulnerable people living in 
poverty. Migration concerns in the EU camp have overshadowed proper dialogue with the 
AU. The EU has begun using a protectionist approach when dealing with Africa, closing 
borders to stop the poor people escaping poverty to enter Europe and closing doors for those 
who hope to trade their agriculture products with the EU.  Following the La Valletta Summit 
2015, African heads of state raised concerns over the EU as they felt the summit was 
dominated by the EU agenda on migration and failed to address the issue of development 











5.1 Could the departure of the UK have any implication on the EU’s poverty reduction 
agenda? 
 
The previous Chapters has been referring to the EU as a collective group of 28 European  
member states, but after four decades as a fully-fledged member, the UK has decided to exit 
the EU. In a referendum held on the 23 June 2016, the electorate had a choice between 
leaving or staying in the EU. The majority voted to leave. This decision to leave has come as a 
surprise for some, but to others, it was a long way coming. 
 
Historically, the UK-EU relationship was more contested than that of any other members 
states. Christopher Lord has argued that Brexit should not surprise anybody, since the UK has 
never entirely accepted the European projects from the onset, and the relationship has 
always been so complicated (Lord, 2018). As hinted by the research question, Brexit has 
profound economic, political, and social implications on the EU’s development agenda in 
Africa. For over fifty years, Africa has had a special relationship with the EU and strong 
bilateral relations with the UK. The EU’s commitments to help Africa reduce poverty is now 
threatened by the UK’s departure from the EU. The UK would potentially move away with 
both well-needed financial and technical expertise. 
 
For years, the UK has been an important voice within the EU, regularly known as an advocate 
for development in African and other least developed countries. The UK and France have been 
instrumental in the informal and formal negotiations with the EU which led to the creation of 
the JAES in 2007 (Cumming & Chafer 2011). The UK was then involved in leading most of the 
priority areas for the JAES. The UK’s exit will have detrimental consequences on the African 
economies (Fasan, 2016; Tan, 2016). This is alarming and calls for an immediate action plan if 
the EU wishes to remain a role model for the AU and succeed in its goal to reduce poverty. 
The UK’s long-standing history of advocacy for the reform of the CAP, hoping to create better 
and equal opportunities between the two institutions, is crucial for the issue of poverty. For 




environment which will in turn help to alleviate poverty in Africa. Without the UK on the 
negotiating table pushing for reform of CAP, African food reserves continue to be threatened 
by EU food dumping, which has a direct impact on African food producers. CAP reform should 
aim to create agriculture-led development programmes that will help alleviate hunger and 
poverty in Africa. 
 
Besides pushing for CAP reform, the UK has been instrumental in advocating for the UN 
agreement for first world countries to commit to a 0,7% Gross National Income (GNI) towards 
ODA to help developing countries (Henökl, 2018). The UK has stayed one of the few countries 
to stick to this commitment, and in 2013, the UK become the first G7 member to achieve the 
0.7% goal. In 2015, the UK even passed this commitment to be enshrined in the UK legislation 
so that the 0,7% commitment becomes law.  
 
The UK is the second most significant supporter of aid and funding towards the EU budget 
(Chang, 2018), suggesting that EU development aid towards the AU will decrease unless the 
EU27 step up to cover the gap. As for 2014, according to the Department for International 
Development (DFID), the UK’s contribution towards aid through the EU amounted to 1.144 
billion pounds (Chang 2018). If the contributions from the UK vanish, the EU would have to 
dedicate more resources towards Africa or risk another failure in foreign policy. Such a 
significant cut in contribution, if not replaced by other means, will have implications on future 
EU-AU relations.  
 
5.2 The role of the UK in the EU 
 
The UK has always been vocal and passionate about negotiations within the EU on 
development in developing countries, especially in Africa. This African connection can be 
traced back from the time when the UK joined the Common Market in 1975; the UK pushed 
that the EDF should include former British colonies. The UK has forged its bilateral relations 
with the region, moving Africans away from aid dependence. The relationship of the UK with 
the AU has made strides in the right direction, making the two institutions best partners 
(contested by others). Since then, other EU members have benefited from this close 




side on developing countries, in particular, the African countries will be missed in EU 
negotiations (Fasan, 2016). 
  
 It is arguably in the best interest of the EU to work closely with the AU to maintain the 
relationship and facilitate a smooth transition of EU development instruments in areas where 
the UK was influential. Future EU negotiations with African counterparts will not be the same 
without the UK mediating, as has been argued by others who assume that Brexit is not bad. 
They suggest that the exit of the UK might finally bring the opportunity to renegotiate and 
reform the EPAs. We argue that the EU should now come up with a trusted plan which is 
attractive and competitive with what China has been offering in areas of development in 
Africa. In addition, China is not going to be the EU’s only competitor but the UK would also 
pursue its interests. 
 
5.3 What would change if the UK is out? 
 
The unexpected exit of the UK has sparked anxiety within the EU, the AU, and the world at 
large, at least due to uncertainties in the areas of development, economic security, and peace. 
As goes the saying, “when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”. Since triggering Article 
50 of the Treaty of Rome in March 2017, it seems like the UK opened a Pandora’s box of 
complex problems. Article 50 was the official way to notify the EU that the UK will be leaving 
the Union. Since then, a lot of uncertainties and concerns arose, leaving people asking 
questions on the future of the European project and the impact of Brexit on the EU-UK 
economies. Even the United States president at the time, President Obama, commented that 
the future of European integration now hangs in question (Financial Times, 2016). From a 
distance, the AU has been wary of its future economic and trading policies with both the EU 
and UK (Holmes, Rollo & Winters 2016). 
 
The UK’s Department of International Development (DFID) manages projects around the 
region, which helps to achieve sustainable goals. Through the UK AID Direct, the UK works 
with small to medium civil society organisations to reach vulnerable and marginalised people 
in a bid to reduce poverty. The UK focuses on improving African countries in various sectors: 




violence against women and girls. In 2015 alone, through the UK aid direct, the UK has 
managed to spend over 131 million euro in order to facilitate the completion of MDGs.  
 
The withdrawal of a major actor like the UK threatens delivery of the European development 
policy, particularly in the area of poverty (Henökl, 2018). The UK played an important role in 
the area of advocacy and poverty reduction by pushing for the African agenda and providing 
financial contributions. The UK is regarded as a strategic partner by most of the AU member 
states due to historic ties. As discussed previously, the UK’s historical ties help to facilitate 
closer political cooperation. The UK has been vocal for engaging the AU as an equal partner. 
The UK’s mediating role enabled the implementation of the JAES. Future AU concerns 
forwarded to the EU for discussion might not get attention from the EU without the UK’s 
backing.  
 
In the event of Brexit, new EPAs would need to be renegotiated, and this creates uncertainties 
as the AU has already been complaining about the way the EU tries to leverage political 
interest when negotiating trade deals and addressing non-political issues(see table 1). There 
is a chance that decisions might take longer to be reached while in the short term, people will 
be getting worse. Brexit becomes a complicated scenario for anybody who has trade 
agreements with the EU. As Parsons concluded, “Brexit is a legal, economic and constitutional 
nightmare for all who have trade agreements with the EU” (Parsons, 2016). These problems 
within the EU also bring to question whether the concept of regional integration is sustainable 
and can lead to any greater good. As discussed in the previous chapter, the AU considers the 
EU as a model for regional integration and aims to abide by all the similar principles.  These 
principles has been beneficial and a contributing factor to manage poverty in Africa. 
 
 
5.4 The impact to Achieving SDGs 
 
The UK played a pivotal role in ensuring that the EU adopted the SDGs and increased its 
budget contributions towards the EDF. In turn, most of the EDF budget was redirected 
towards Africa, enabling the EU to establish a close relationship with the AU. The active role 
by the UK enabled the EDF to be channeled towards crucial areas of development which are 




been able to lead and direct EDF toward areas of serious need. The experience with the EU 
working with most countries in Africa at bilateral level provided the UK with current 
information and enabled it to identify key areas that need immediate attention. When dealing 
with vulnerable communities, it is vital to align financial resources to critical areas. In 
evaluating the success of the MDGs and SDGs, the ERD report noticed something uniform 
with the two programmes was the disconnection between the financial support and policy 
areas (EU Commissioner, 2019). Policy coherence is crucial in the context of the 2030 SDGs 
agenda.The UK has a strong influence in Africa due to its geographic proximity and its colonial 
legacies. The UK’s bilateral relations with most of the key players in Africa has been a 
significant pillar which bonded the EU-AU for years.  
 
5.5 The UK impact on trade deals 
 
Trade between the UK and African countries is higher than any other EU member state. 
However, soon after the referendum vote’s results, the UK’s sterling depreciated significantly 
against other currencies. An estimate of about GBP 200 billion was lost on the stock markets. 
A poor performance by the British sterling creates uncertainties, as the UK contributes a 
significant amount of money towards the EU and towards its current development projects 
in Africa and through remittances. The decline of the sterling is a concern as it reduces the 
amount of remittances from the UK to Africa. Remittances are one of the most important 
cross-border revenues for developing countries (Mold, 2018). The 0.7% of UK GNI 
commitment to the ODA decreases in turn. Any revenue loses have the potential to affect the 
AU in both the short term and long term. 
 
While the relationship between Britain and African member states is far from perfect, former 
UK Prime Minister Theresa May has already started plans to gain favour among AU member 
states. In March 2018, Mrs. May toured Africa with a delegation of business people and 
promised $ 5.2 billion of support towards the continent (The Economist, 2018). Already this 
is a problem for The EU 27, who might now need to dig deeper in their pockets to compete 






5.6 The UK’s contribution towards poverty reduction projects in Africa 
 
The EU 28 (including the UK) have been helpful in African by assisting in projects that can help 
these countries be sustainable and build food reserves. If successful, this would help Africa 
stop relying on aid from the West. Draught and famine are the root of migration, especially 
from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. These dire 
conditions result in most African states experiencing dramatic food and water shortages. 
Records from Oxfam indicates that these shortages often lead to poor performance in the 
agriculture sector. Agriculture is crucial in Africa, as most families rely on agriculture as a 
source of income and to provide daily food. The EU 28 have played a significant role in helping 
Africa to tackle pressures which might reduce agricultural production. Climate change, 
disease, land degradation, and growing population calls for innovative agriculture methods. 
 
In response to these potential challenges, the EU teamed up (led by UK) with Africa to provide 
agricultural expertise by funding research, which will provide solutions to improve food 
security. Over the years, the EU has run the Global Programme on Agriculture Research for 
Development (GPARD) projects. The results show the GRDP projects have succeeded in 
increasing agriculture diversification, educating smallholder farmers to become resilient to 
climate change, empowering farmers with agricultural innovation while maintaining 
traditional methods, creating access to markets and improving control of diseases 
threatening agriculture. The EU has dedicated over 41 million euro towards GRDP in order to 
address food security: A step towards achieving the first SDG. Almost all the countries in the 
AU have benefited from this initiative. The implementation of this initiative is through CSOs 
and international organisations and other EU partners. 
 
As mentioned in the previous Chapters, the UK is known for negotiating strongly on behalf of 
the AU when it comes to agriculture development. The position taken by the UK when 
negotiating African issues within the EU is essential for the future of AU food security. The 
departure of the UK’s voice in these areas threatens food security and the goal of eradicating 





5.7 The impact of Brexit on the EU Budget 
 
Because the UK’s contribution towards the EU development fund budget is significant; if the 
UK stops contributing, the EU will suffer a substantial budget shortfall and long-term 
development realignment (Henökl, 2018). The effect of Brexit on EU finance is significant and 
has the potential to disrupt the day-to-day lives of those who have close economic ties with 
both the EU and the UK. Without the UK’s contributions, the gap left would need to be 
addressed for the EU to retain its current position as a global economic giant. Within the EU, 
the UK has been one of the top three of the highest contributors on the EDF, together with 
France and Germany.  
 
It is estimated that the UK’s departure would reduce the EU budget by at least 10 billion euro 
per year. The EU budget is also one of the reasons fueling the UK’s departure. The Leave 
campaign claimed that leaving the EU would enable the UK to use the money it contributes 
towards the EU budget on other areas which are currently not a priority for the EU. Unless 
the remaining EU 27 increases their contributions to cover this shortfall, the EU is left with no 
option but to reduce spending. Reducing spending has implications for prior commitments, 
which include development goals committed before Brexit. African development falls in this 
category. If the EU cuts its spending, it is unlikely that it will reduce its spending on its member 
states. The possibility is that money which was usually destined for the EDF might be diverted 
to areas of interest for the EU, and this might not involve African development. 
 
Since the Brexit referendum, the British sterling lost its value against other currencies like the 
US dollar and the euro. By losing its value, the sterling created a shortfall in the 2016 EU 
budget. There is overwhelming evidence to support the notion that Brexit has implications 
for the EU budget (Haas & Rubio, 2017).  The budget gap experienced by the EU due to the 
sterling depreciation against the euro has both long-term and short-term effects. In the 
immediate term, the commission should have a plan B to cover this deficit, while in the long-
term, there is a need to reform the contribution structure of the EU budget.  
 
Research conducted by the Jacques Gelors Institute suggests a loss of at least 10 billion euro 




DG Budget. The calculation was based on the presumption that the EU budget without the 
UK’s contributions would affect EU expenditure. The simulation results indicated that the 
Brexit gap would mean that the EU would lose at least 14 billion euro per year from the UK 
government (Haas & Rubio, 2017). Figure 3 below illustrates the 10 billion gap. While this 
simulation is only based on estimates and remains an assumption, it is most likely that the 
shortfall will be evident in the overall EU spending. 
 
 
 Figure 6: Total EU budget with the UK 
Source: Jacques Delors Institute, 2017 
 
Importance to note here is that the 10 billion euro cuts represent a considerable amount of 
money when compared to what the EU spends on its international projects. The figure below 
illustrates how much a Brexit gap would look like in terms of the EU budget. The 10 billion 
euro deficit exceeds the budget dedicated by the EU towards the Global Europe budget, 
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Figure 7: EU Budget 2019 vs Brexit gap 
Source: EU Budget 
 
Besides stepping up with financial contributions, the UK played a crucial role as a political 
mediator between the EU and the African countries. From a UK perspective, Africa is a 
strategic partner but not a major trading partner (Mold, 2018). A mere 2.6% of imports and 
exports are to and from the UK, but in economic terms, when international economies are 
unstable, Africans or other developing economies always underperform. The weakness of the 
British sterling and Brexit uncertainties are already creating panic within African economies. 
 
In terms of EU development and Africa, the problem is that there is no assurance that the EU 
will continue to help African countries building their economies and providing aid from that 
smaller budget. Without the UK advocating for Africans, that is unlikely to happen. Without 
the UK on the negotiating table, the EU might choose to channel their money into other areas 
than development in Africa. The UK’s involvement at negotiations advocating for more 
funding and development aid towards Africa will be missed at the EU negotiations. That alone 
is concerning for the AU’s development programmes. The EU would likely cut its spending 
budget, particularly on CAP, which is an area where the UK most famously asked for reform. 
Apart from natural resources, agriculture is the most important industry sustaining Africans. 
 
Some have argued Brexit could be beneficial for the AU and provide the AU with options and 
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2016). From an African point of view, the UK is strategically important but is still a small 
market for AU total exports. The argument is that Brexit would mean the EU has less leverage 
when negotiating than they used to have. It also means that the EU-AU relationship might 
change for the better. While this optimism might become a reality, this thesis still argues that 
new negotiations will take time and that AU citizens will suffer in the short term. 
 
5.8 The impact of Brexit on aid destined for African Union projects 
 
According to a report by the OECD, the EU, together with its member states, is the biggest aid 
provider of ODA contributions, responsible for over 50% (Mendez-Parra, Te Velde & Kennan, 
2017). Within the EU, the UK is a larger contributor than other EU member states. Following 
the referendum, UK aid suffered as the pound plummeted down compared to other 
currencies (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). Because commitments towards 
funding EDF are already secured until 2020, the UK needs to keep its commitments as part of 
the divorce negotiations. This gives the EU time to prepare for the next steps on how to 
restructure the budget, making sure that any restructuring will not be detrimental to its 
member states and problematic to its relationship with the AU. 
 
The UK funds most donors operating in Africa, with their head offices in the UK.  Most of them 
have expressed concern over the future of their funding, considering the work that still needs 
to be done in Africa. The UK brings a lot of development expertise, which the EU has adopted 
into its development policy beyond financial contributions. The departure of the UK will have 
a significant financial impact, therefore, if the EU wants to continue to be regarded as the 
world’s biggest donor and force for development in Africa, the EU 27 needs to regroup. 
 
In response to such concerns, the EU 2019 budget, which aimed to increase the development 
budget by 10 percent compared to past years, has been criticised by NGOs. Oxfam, Save the 
children, Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung and International Planned Parenthood 
Federation European Network have argued that the 10 percent increase is far from reducing 
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. The NGOs blamed the EU for focusing more on its internal 





The NGOs are arguing that the EU has increased the development budget but cut spending 
on areas that have the potential to reduce poverty. In a statement the NGOs have said:  
 
The fight against poverty and inequality must not become an afterthought. The EU proposes 
to divert ever more development money to stop migration, ignoring the actual needs of 
people. Member states should instead increase funds for health, education, social protection, 
and gender equality, which are vital for human development. (Save the Children, 2018) 
 
The NGOs claim that the EU priorities are already driven by its political interests rather than 
its mandate to achieve long-term human development goals. Looking back at the Consensus 
for Development, the EU’s commitment to increase its development assistance to 20 percent 
has not been met, and the new EU budget does not show any desire to achieve the target. 
 
Some of the repercussions of Brexit include the future coordination of UK charities currently 
doing work in Africa. These charities have benefited from the EDF due to influence by the UK, 
so without the UK to act as a voice for these donors, the EU might prioritise other projects in 
other regions than African countries. Anderson and Michell (2016) have also lamented the 
absence of political influence as detrimental to future EU commitments on development in 
former British colonies. 
 
5.9 Can the EU remain a model for AU integration? 
 
Since its inception in 2002, the African Union has been inspired by the European Union 
integration framework (Haastrup, 2013). The AU was formed as a response to the problems 
encountered during the existence of the OAU, which led to Morocco leaving. After this 
reform, the AU has tried to align itself to the EU institutional model. In integration terms, the 
EU has been regarded as a role model, but the role model is now wobbly (Mold, 2018). 
 
Brexit has great potential to reduce the EU’s political influence (Henökl, 2018). Democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights, good governance, conflict resolution, and sustainable 
development have become important principles advocated by the AU (Smith, 2003), which is 




are universal; therefore, it should be enforced by all its member states. The EU is involved in 
funding the AU’s regional integration project. From this perspective, the AU has taken the 
MDGs and SDGs seriously in order to achieve its aspirations and at the same time fulfill EU aid 
conditionalities. Brexit will leave the AU questioning the viability of the regional integration 
process. 
 
Development is considered one of the keys to stability. A stable AU can contribute to peace 
and security. A weak and unstable AU will affect its potential to drive the economic 
development agenda. The formation of the AU is seen as a catalyst to facilitate this stability. 
Others have also argued that there is a correlation between poverty and conflicts. This could 
be the reason why the EU embarked and committed to JAES  poverty eradication projects to 
reduce conflicts. The EU believes that if its neighbourhood is stable, its boarders will be safe 
and reduce the number of refugees to Europe. Brexit has indirect and direct effects on 
people’s wellbeing, and the results of instability are extreme poverty conditions and 
migration crises. 
 
Another argument presented by other scholars who see Brexit as beneficial for the AU, is that 
Brexit should be taken as a lesson for the AU. The confusion and economic, political, and social 
complexities should be enough to deter them from disintegrating the Union. According to 
Haastrup (2013), because of the historical context of EU-AU relations, Brexit is a sentimental 
loss. The UK played a vital role in bringing its former colonies together when they joined the 















Chapter 6: Concluding remarks 
 
In this final chapter, the research will focus on providing concluding remarks. At this point, 
attention is drawn towards the previously discussed areas associated with poverty (see Figure 
1). This Chapter brings all the pieces of the puzzle together to answer the research question: 
“What are the possible implications of Brexit on EU development agenda, in particular, the 
agenda to eradicate poverty in Africa?” The conclusion addresses the financial, social, political 
and human development impact both in the short and long term as all these areas contribute 
towards poverty reduction. 
 
6.1    The financial impact of Brexit on AU living standards, education, and health 
 
Most of the literature has focused on the potential impact of Brexit on the EU-UK relations 
and neglected its severe reparations for the developing counties in the South (ODI, 2016, 
Mendez-Parra et al., 2016; Holmes and Winter, 2016). The AU is an important region to study, 
as the continent holds a longstanding economic relationship with the UK due to colonial ties, 
as well as with the EU, since the EU is a significant economic partner for the African continent. 
This thesis did not claim to give a comprehensive assessment of Brexit’s impact on all aspects 
of development, but rather present possible scenarios based on previous and present data. 
Particular attention has been given to the area of poverty reduction; a mandate taken by the 
EU in their relationships with the AU through the JAES. 
 
The immediate depreciation of the British pound soon after the Brexit vote indicates 
undeniably that Brexit has a negative implication on the economy. Immediately after the 
sterling succumbing to the Leave vote, many reports via opinion polling of UK citizens 
suggested cutting the UK’s commitment of the 0.7% towards aid (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & 
Szent-Iványi, 2017). At the same, as noted by Tan (2016), the South African economy felt the 
pressure and lost its value. Therefore, Brexit did affect not only the local economy but also 
global economies. Others have also concluded that Brexit means a negative impact on 





Trade is a significant component binding the two continents together. Both the EU and AU 
benefit from trade relations. These trade flows are essential for economic growth and the 
provision of basic food to the African population. If these transactions are interrupted, they 
could impede economic growth, resulting in unemployment, inflation, hunger, and starvation. 
 
In 2013, the European Commission resolved to dedicate at least 3.5 billion euro towards 
nutrition in developing countries, as outlined in the 2014 Commission action plan on nutrition 
(European Commission, 2014). According to Commissioner Neven Mimica, “hunger and 
malnutrition are detrimental to peace and prosperity; therefore, it should be fought in order 
to achieve a long-lasting peace” (Mimica, 2018). In 2017, through the European Union 
Consensus on Development, the commission adopted the 2030 SDGs as an important part of 
development. The Commission aimed to reduce the number of children and minors living in 
poverty. The goal for 2025 was set to reduce these numbers by 7 million (European 
Commission, 2014).  
 
These initiatives to reduce the number of children who would sometimes live without 
nutritious food is a significant step towards reducing poverty. The timeframe set to achieve 
these ambitious goals fully will be affected by Brexit. The target to meet the 7 million children 
by 2025 was made with the UK’s involvement, committing financial and technical support.  
 
Because Brexit will have both a short and long-term impact, it is recommended these 
concerns must be investigated. 
 
6.2 The impact of Brexit on policy framework:  The EU negotiations without the UK 
 
 
The progress made by the European Commission’s negotiating of better partnership 
strategies with the AU are now in jeopardy due to uncertainties of the future of EU foreign 
policy. Some AU member states are concerned about their future trade relations and whether 
they should focus on negotiating with the UK alone. An example, is a refusal by the Tanzanian 
and Ugandan governments (both AU members states) to ratify EPAs due to uncertainties 




6.3 The Cotonou renewal negotiations 
 
The Cotonou agreement is about to expire in 2020 and negotiations are already underway. 
This is a crucial time for the UK to be available on debates on how to shape the future 
relationship and influence objectives of development. Without the EU’s internal influence due 
to the UK’s historical, moral obligation as a commonwealth member, the negotiations might 
be one-sided of just pushing for policies in favour of the EU; mostly in the area of CAP, where 
the EU has been cited to be taking a protectionist approach (Fasan, 2016). The UK and its 
representatives have been vocally in favour of fairer trade agreements and global market 
integration with AU members (Langan, 2016). While this powerful stance taken by the UK falls 
in the short term, it is also applicable as a long-term consequence.  
 
6.4 The Common Agricultural Policy reform 
 
Another vital area to be addressed when discussing strategies to reduce poverty is the area 
of agriculture. Even though the UK’s efforts of advocating for CAP reform in order to benefit 
African developing countries have not been fruitful, the UK’s pro-development voice 
representing the Africans will disappear entirely in future policy negotiations.(Ansorg & 
Haastrup, 2016). This is a significant disadvantage to the AU governments who aspire to 
reduce poverty in all its forms in their countries. Agriculture is the leading provider of income 
to most African families. Africans benefit from producing their food and selling in the region, 
but the EU has been criticised for dumping its commodities in the region, making it difficult 
for the people who survive on agriculture to earn any income. Many NGOs have blamed the 
EU for undercutting African farmers’ livelihoods. As discussed in previous sections, without 
the UK and its representatives at the council advocating for ACP reforms there will be 
repercussions for Africans both in the short and long term. This interference in most African 
families’ sources of income exacerbate the levels of poverty. 
 
6.5 The Long-term impact of Brexit on poverty reduction in Africa 
 
The longer-term impacts can be summed by looking at how the UK and the EU are already 




commitment by the UK, the UK should honour this legal obligation. Though it is not 
guaranteed that the EU will consider UK’s interests in the future budget. The UK is supposed 
to contribute at least 4.5 billion euro, which is 14.7% of the EDF for the period 2014-2020. 
The only concern is that, even though the UK contributes its share, it will not have a say on 
how the money is going to be spent.  
 
The UK has already indicated that it will need to review all development policies. The rhetoric 
suggests that the UK will be moving towards policies that are focused on economic growth as 
machinery for development rather than focusing on poverty eradication (Ansorg & Haastrup, 
2016; Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). As the UK has been benefiting from trading 
with most countries through its EU links, without the EU, the UK would need to start seeking 
trade deals. As for now, UK spending conforms to the law, which stipulates that international 
development must aim at poverty reduction. The current Conservative Party has promised to 
review this policy soon. Most likely, the UK will be using aid to leverage for better trade deals 
rather than aiming for poverty reduction (Mawdsley, 2015). It is also likely that the UK might 
consider changing the law completely. 
 
In the long run, the EU might also choose to redirect aid away from Africa. Since the UK was 
influential in negotiating aid for Africa and for Commonwealth countries of the ACP, without 
the UK, the EU might choose to pursue other areas of development on areas strategic for the 
EU. As experienced in the past during the enlargement, the EU reduced its spending in Africa 
and focused on former communist countries who were working towards accession. These 
historic flashbacks do not indicate that the EU without the UK will consider Africa as one of 
the top priority regions, since there are also calls for poverty alleviation in other parts of the 
World. 
 
Another area of discussion is the coordination of aid donors. The UK has played a leadership 
role in coordinating donors in the past when other member states showed an unwillingness 
to coordinate. Without its expertise, this could impede aid effectiveness, and without the 
UK’s voice on how EDF is used, poverty eradication in Africa might be overlooked. The only 




the fact that these offices are not found in many countries which the EU have been assisting 
with funding. In Africa, the EU has worked with CSO and IOs with the help of the UK. 
 
Some parts of Africa are considered unstable (for example, Sudan, Somalia, the DRC) and 
others are facing migration challenges. The idea of regional integration has been considered 
instrumental in bringing the countries together. Following many civil wars that tore the 
continent apart, the formation of the AU helped to stop these fights. Some have even argued 
that the EU model is beneficial for the AU and the EU is considered a mentor. Brexit will bring 
the whole regional integration idea into question. If the African regional integrations fall 
apart, there is a higher chance that poor people will suffer and become worse than when their 




The study of the EU and its role in Africa is essential when studying the future of the UK-EU 
relations post-Brexit. For most of the time, the EU internal discussions have been focused on 
the economic implications of Brexit within Europe, but some attention should be given to its 
external relations. Brexit implications are not only going to be devastating on the EU member 
states’ economies but also in its neighbourhood. The implications of Brexit on Africa should 
be considered seriously in order to forge a way forward without disrupting its previous 
commitments. The absence of the EU in Africa at the moment is worrying, as it does not 
assure the AU whether the EU will remain a reliable partner post-Brexit. The EU needs to 
assure the AU that they will continue to take development seriously post-Brexit.  
 
This research has demonstrated that Brexit is not only a concerning matter for the EU-UK 
alone but for the rest of the world. This thesis has highlighted the impact of Brexit on African 
countries in the short and long term. Due to the historical connection between the two 
continents and the UK’s moral obligations towards most AU countries, Africa becomes more 
vulnerable to Brexit. 
 
The relationship between the two continents has been revised several times, starting with 




behind these partnerships is the desire to eliminate poverty in all of its forms. The EU is 
perceived as a leader in areas of development, and the UK as a pro-development member 
state who always advocates for AU member states at EU negotiations, in particular for reform 
of CAP. Agriculture is vital for African countries and is a vehicle used to end poverty as it 
provides human capital, employment, food, and is an important contributor to economies 
and poverty reduction. The UK played a vital role in pushing the EU to reform the CAP to allow 
African farmers compete with their products on international markets.  
 
Without the EU’s financial contributions, the AU will have to figure out a plan to meet the 
development programmes which used to be funded through aid in order to feed vulnerable 
families. The thesis outlined in detail how much the UK’s contribution to the EU has helped 
to push the EU position as a global aid provider. The budget deficit, estimated at over 10 
percent, is a significant gap in the context with how much the EU dedicates towards Global 
Europe projects. This thesis has argued that if there is no immediate funding restructuring 
within the EU, the EU might divert the currently available funding, which used to be sent 
towards Africa, to other interest. On the budget issue, the EU 27 should aim to increase their 
contribution towards the EU budget rather than cutting its spending as that will have 
immediately detrimental effects on developing countries. 
 
The EU is no longer regarded as the only strategic partner in Africa. This thesis has 
acknowledged the impact of China, the USA, Russia, Canada, and India, who are increasingly 
helping African countries to further their economies, though it still argued that Brexit will be 
detrimental to the area of human development. While these other players are suitable for 
African states, the close connection with the EU has helped many AU countries to export to 
EU countries, meaning more opportunities for trading. If the EU without the UK adjusts the 
EPAs, African countries will immediately lose on trade deals that were benefiting their 
economies. 
 
The study offers recommendations to both the EU and the UK, but if the EU wants to retain 
its leadership position in Africa and continue the journey to eradicating poverty, dialogue 
needs to start soon. The EU should also consider the importance of agriculture in Africa and 




inequalities. Subsidising agriculture in the EU and dumping of EU commodities in Africa 
undercuts local markets leading to more families in extreme poverty. 
 
The EU should take a leading role and start consultations with the AU as the dangers of 
extreme migration will impact EU member states. If citizens of AU countries are affected by 
more poverty, that will lead to people flocking to Europe to seek a better life, which will affect 
both the EU and UK. The impact of migration also affects other areas, such as security, 
especially with economic challenges currently experienced. 
 
The last chapter also highlighted that the current negotiations on the renewal of the Cotonou 
agreement are vital for poverty reduction in Africa. These negotiations will soon suffer from 
the absence of the UK, who has always played an important role in looking after the interests 
of commonwealth countries. 
 
As with any research, there have been limitations to this thesis. First, this being a Masters 
thesis, there are limitations on the word count, which means there is a restriction on what 
could be written. Secondly, studying two such large continents (institutions) like the AU and 
EU demands time and resources, both financial and technical. Africa is an interesting 
continent on this point, due to the interests of other bigger actors like China, Russia, and India 
mentioned in the previous chapters. It would have been interesting and beneficial to the 
research if interviews were conducted with AU leaders to understand their opinions on Brexit. 
The conclusion of the thesis is based on generalisation and speculative projections, since no 
AU head of state was contacted to get their view. China’s presence is increasing in Africa, and 
the EU views that as a problem. Future research could be a comparative study of EU-China 
development policy in Africa with both attempting to reduce poverty. 
 
Finally, since Brexit has not yet been completed, we can only wait to see what its impact will 
be. The thesis assumed that there could be a negative impact. Depending on the outcome of 
the negotiations and the route the UK decides to take, this thesis conclusion might be 
challenged. Future research might be done to evaluate the Brexit process and consequences 




benefit from. If the assumptions of this thesis are correct, it may serve as a base for reference 
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